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Abstract
Conventional Bayesian games of incomplete information are limited in their ability to represent severe in-
completeness of information. Using an illustrative example of (seller o¤er) sequential bargaining with one-
sided incomplete information, we analyze a dynamic game under ambiguity. The novelty of our model is
the stark assumption that the seller has complete ignorance represented by the set of all plausible prior
distributions over the buyers type. We propose a new equilibrium concept Perfect Objectivist Equi-
librium (POE) in which multiple priors and full Bayesian updating characterize the belief system, and
the uninformed player maximizes the inmum expected utility over non-weakly-dominated strategies. We
provide a novel justication for rening POE through Markov perfection, and obtain a unique rened equilib-
rium. This results in a New Coase Conjecture a competitive outcome arising from an apparent monopoly,
which does not require the discount rate to approach zero, and is robust to reversion caused by reputation
equilibria.
Key words: ambiguity, dynamic game with incomplete information, bargaining power, bargaining in-
determinacy, Markov perfection, deationary expectation, Coase Conjecture
JEL classication: D82, D83, C7, C78
Acknowledging what is known as known, what is not known as unknown, that is knowledge.
 Analects of Confucius
What has now appeared is that the mathematical concept of probability is inadequate to express our
mental condence or di¢ dence in making such inferences, and that the mathematical quantity which appears
to be appropriate for measuring our order of preference among di¤erent possible populations does not in
fact obey the laws of probability. To distinguish it from probability, I have used the term likelihoodto
designate this quantity.
 Sir R. A. Fisher (1925)
1 Introduction
Numerous economic models, especially dynamic Bayesian games, routinely start with the presumption that
a decision maker is endowed with a unique prior probabilistic belief about an unknown state of the world. A
crucial implication of this presumption is to permit the notions of optimal risk taking and expected utility
maximization to be well dened and employed. From an epistemic point of view, since inferences must start
from somewhere, a unique prior seems a reasonable starting point, as is often argued by defenders of the
Savage-Bayesian paradigm.
At a fundamental level, this line of argument has been increasingly questionable in light of the recent
literature on multiple priors and ambiguity (Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Schmeidler (GMMS), 2010;
Manski, 2008) according to which a multiple-prior belief system should be the rule and the unique-prior
belief system is just a special case. Epstein and Schneider (2007) further illustrate that in a multiple-priors
setting, some form of likelihood inference can suitably extend or replace the familiar Bayesian inference
based on a single prior. Once the generic presumption of a single prior is removed, the notion of optimal
risk taking can become ill-dened, which in turn invalidates behavior predictions built upon this notion.
Using a (seller o¤er) sequential bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information1 and common
interest,2 we demonstrate how epistemic subjectivity can be avoided in modelling playersprior beliefs in
a dynamic game of incomplete information, and predict its consequence. By allowing multiple priors, we
show that arbitrary restrictions on the set of priors, such as uniqueness, are unnecessary. To x ideas,
consider a seller who has an exclusive right to propose the price of a good to a buyer, whose valuation of
the good is his private information and thus his type. Suppose the seller has complete ignorance about the
buyers type. This can happen either because the seller is venturing into a totally unfamiliar territory or
eld, or because her intellectual and epistemic condence has been shaken after major nancial or economic
crises. She thus justiably doubts the relevance and applicability of any established statistical regularity
to the characterization of the buyers type. Nevertheless, the conventional Bayesian will have to force the
1Bargaining power relation between transacting parties lies at the heart of social and economic interactions. Among its
various determinants, the e¤ect of incompleteness of information may be of great importance. For example, if one transacting
party has an apparent monopoly position but lacks commitment to her proposed terms of transaction (like a durable good
monopolist, or a seller with incomplete information about the buyers valuation), the willingness of the monopolist to make
future concession may create competition with herself, and in e¤ect lose her monopoly status. This is (the essence of) the
famous Coase Conjecture (see Coase, 1972; Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson, 1986). Therefore bargaining games are an extremely
interesting context for studying the implications of ambiguous (multiple-prior) belief system on bargaining power relation.
2The common interest component in the bargaining relation entails a minimal level of congruence between the parties
interests.
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assumption that the seller forms a unique prior probability measure, e.g., a uniform distribution, over the
buyers type. This is epistemically awed since any probability measure, including the uniform distribution,
is informative and therefore cannot adequately represent complete ignorance.3 This restrictive assumption
understates the degree of incompleteness of information. In contrast, the assumption of ignorance can be
adequately represented by the set of all plausible priors within the multiple-prior approach, ruling nothing
out.
When ambiguity (i.e., large set of priors) is modelled to represent a high degree of incompleteness of the
information, a decision markers optimal choice may become ambiguous in the sense that the set of optimum
is too large (e.g., a continuum) to render the term optimal risk taking behaviormeaningful4 . In such
cases, the uninformed players behavior becomes unpredictable on the basis of individual rationality alone,
and hence may result in multiplicity of equilibria in strategic games. This possibility is particularly relevant
in the context of bargaining since if an uninformed player who has the right to make the o¤er is ambiguous
about what her preferred term of transaction is, many arbitrary bargaining strategies can be rationalized
which can cause bargaining indeterminacy. This novel cause of potential bargaining indeterminacy and its
resolution are an interesting application and motivation of our theory of dynamic games under ambiguity.
Our illustrative example is based on seller o¤er sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete informa-
tion. In contrast to the conventional Bayesian model, the main novelty of our model is the stark assumption
that the seller has complete ignorance represented by the set of all plausible prior distributions over the
buyers type. For the sake of connecting with the Coase Conjecture5 , we choose the standard assumption
that the lower bound of total surplus from trade is negative (no gapas known in the literature). We also
add another novel feature to the model the assumption that if trade occurs, besides the price of the good,
the seller also benets from some positive externality6 which is proportional to the valuation of the good
by the buyer. Even at the limit as the magnitude of the positive externality becomes innitesimal this
qualitatively important feature can make the seller a bit keener to trade with the seller.
As a standard assumption, the seller is an expected utility maximizer if she is endowed with a unique
probability measure about the state of the world. Her incompleteness of information about the true state of
the world means that her expected utility is not well-dened in general so she may not form complete ordering
over alternative strategies. How this potential indecision (incompleteness of preferences) is resolved depends
critically on the sellers attitude toward ambiguity. Following GMMS (2010) we consider the uninformed
players objective is to maximize her inmum expected utility over non-weakly-dominated strategies. This
decision rule has two criteria: The rst is the max-inf expected utility criterion, which is a slight variant
3 It is now well known (see Edwards 1992, pp. 57-61) that a single probability distribution cannot accurately represent
complete ignorance.
4As a specic application of this point, the notion of optimal second degree price discriminationalso becomes (practically)
meaningless if the monopolist seller knows that she does not know the distribution of the buyers type. Similarly, even the
familiar notion of monopoly pricingcan become (practically) meaningless if the monopolist seller knows that she has no clue
about the actual demand function.
5The original Coase Conjecture (Coase 1972) envisages a surprising phenomenon of competitive outcome arising from durable
good monopoly. Later literature on conventional Bayesian game of (seller o¤er) sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete
information identies an equivalent outcome, which we also informally refer to as the Coase Conjecture. Here we use the
scare quotes to indicate this informal references to both the original durable good monopoly and the later sequential bargaining
versions.
6For example, this can be (user generated) knowledge about the commercial value of the product or technology the seller
(rm) is developing, from which the rm can benet in the future. It seems reasonable to assume that this positive externality
is higher if the buyer has a higher valuation of the product or technology. The magnitude of this externality has no signicance
for our main result which still holds as the magnitude approaches zero.
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of the familiar max-min expected utility criterion.7 The second is the criterion that no weakly dominated
strategy should be chosen if there exist multiple max-inf solutions.8 Although these decision criteria help
guarantee the completeness of preferences, in the bargaining context, they may prove too weak to help resolve
a potential bargaining indeterminacy. This is where the renement of equilibria by Markov perfection ts in
well and seems to have a particular justication.
Our paper makes ve main contributions. First, we formulate and analyze a dynamic game of incomplete
information with a multiple-prior belief system as opposed to the conventional single-prior Bayesian game,
a la Harsanyi (1967, 1968a,b). Second, we complement the emerging literature on learning under ambigu-
ity (Epstein and Schneider, 2003, 2007) by incorporating strategic interactions between rational players into
learning under ambiguity. Third, we present a new equilibrium concept the Perfect Objectivist Equilibrium
(POE) which extends and contrasts the familiar Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) that is the standard
in dynamic single-prior Bayesian games. The term objectivistemphasizes the importance of epistemic ob-
jectivity in the learning process. The new equilibrium concept also allows us to deal with out-of-equilibrium
updating of beliefs in a systematic way. Fourth, we show that the epistemic under-determination of prob-
abilistic belief adds a new cause for potential bargaining indeterminacy i.e., multiplicity of POE and
provide a novel justication for its resolution through equilibrium renement based on Markov perfection.
We fully characterize and establish the existence and uniqueness of a Markov Perfect Objectivist Equilib-
rium (MPOE) for our sequential bargaining model. Fifth, we contrast the Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(MPBE) and the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the conventional Bayesian version of the model with
the MPOE of our model. Comparing the equilibria reveals how severe incompleteness of information impacts
bargaining power, and allows us to o¤er new insights into the renowned Coase Conjecture.
Our model of a multiple-prior belief system is built upon the axiomatic foundation laid by GMMS
(2010) which, in turn, is a synthesis of the pioneering works of Bewley (1986, 2002) and Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). Crucially, GMMS (2010) interpret the former strand as representing objectively rational
preferences, and the latter, subjectively rational preferences. The contrast between the two is: the former
does not involve personal attitude toward ambiguity, but cannot assure the completeness of the preferences
relation; while the latter does rely on personal taste (over ambiguity) to achieve the completeness of the
preferences relation. In comparison with the axiomatic foundation of the subjective probability theory
notably, the popular version by Anscombe and Aumann 1963) GMMS (2010) propose less restrictive sets of
axioms for a pair of rational preference relations (representing objective rationality and subjective rationality
respectively).9 Based on these more reasonable sets of rationality axioms, GMMS (2010) prove that rational
beliefs of a decision maker as revealed by hypothetical betting behavior are represented by a set of multiple
prior probability measures (hence ambiguity) as opposed to the Savage-Bayesian unique-prior belief system.
7 It could be argued that the max-min (max-inf) criterion for decision making under ambiguity may be too cautious or
pessimistic. Now there is a rich variety of models of decision making under ambiguity that consider weaker representations
of aversion to ambiguity. (See Gilboa and Marinacci (2011) for a survey of axiomatic decision theoretic models.) While we
appreciate that the modelling choice of the max-min (max-inf) criterion cannot claim to be compelling and unrestrictive, we
suggest that this weakness may not be so critical in the context of games under ambiguity because as will transpire through
the analysis of the bargaining under ambiguity a key problem to be tackled is the multiplicity of equilibria. In applications,
the (potential) restrictiveness of the max-min (max-inf) criterion per se can turn out to be not restrictive enough because the
indi¤erence curve remains too fat to help resolve the problem of multiplicity of equilibria.
8This criterion was advocated by Manski (2008). We suggest that GMMS (2010) when suitably extended could provide
an axiomatic foundation for this condition.
9The subjective (or personal) probability theory was pioneered by Ramsey (1926), de Finetti (1937) and Savage (1954).
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Since the multiple prior belief system makes the subjective expected utility theory unworkable, GMMS (2010)
also provide an axiomatic foundation for the minimum expected utility theory which is a substitute for
the subjective expected utility theory. Our model of decision under ambiguity is more explicit than GMMS
(2010) in separating beliefs from tastes over ambiguity we require that the rational beliefs should be free
from epistemic subjectivity even at the cost of increased ambiguity. In explicitly adopting lexicographic
preferences, we require the objectively rational preferences to be primary and the subjectively rational to
be secondary. The former is based on the weak dominance partial order therefore action plan A is strictly
preferred to plan B if and only if A weakly dominates B. If A and B cannot be primarily ranked according to
the former, then they will be secondarily ranked according to the latter which is complete and represented
by the inmum expected utility function.
Our model of learning under ambiguity is closely related to the seminal works of Epstein and Schneider
(2003, 2007), which study belief updating and likelihood inference under multiple priors. Our paper adopts
the likelihood inference as a generic extension or replacement of Bayesian inference to avoid epistemic sub-
jectivity in beliefs. Starting with a set of objectively plausible priors, the learning process is modelled as
a prior-by-prior Bayesian updating on the basis of a likelihood function to derive a set of objectively
plausible posteriors. In a game-theoretic context, we assign a central role to the deduced equilibrium path
in determining the likelihood function and belief updating. The multiple-prior likelihood inference we adopt
can be seen as a synthesis of ideas from the three competing philosophies of statistics: Bayesian (Bayes
Theorem, prior-by-prior Bayesian updating), frequentist (hypothesis testing theory) and Fisherian (likeli-
hood).10 A central theme of this synthesis is the realization that a single prior (or posterior) probability
measure is not a su¢ cient statistic to summarize existent information11 while multiple prior distributions
plus likelihoods more adequately represent knowledge and ignorance.12
Our paper also contributes to the literature of sequential bargaining (see Rubinstein 1982, 1987 for origin
and survey), particularly, sequential bargaining under incomplete information.13 (For surveys, see Fudenberg
and Tirole 1991, Chapter 10; Kennan and Wilson 1993; Ausubel, Cramton and Deneckere 2000.) Rubinstein
(1982) formulated and characterized an alternating o¤ers bilateral bargaining game with complete informa-
tion. An important insight that emerged from the Rubinstein dynamic bargaining theory is that taking
bargaining procedure as given the players time preferences (i.e., discount rates) are a key determinant
of bargaining power and outcome: the higher the discount rate, the more costly to reject the opponents
o¤er, the weaker ones bargaining power.14 It is an amazing discovery in sequential bargaining games with
complete information, positive discount rates help resolving bargaining indeterminacy which is prevalent in
static bargaining games. Models of sequential bargaining under incomplete information allow the surplus
from trade to be private information of informed players, therefore are useful to describe many realistic
bargaining situations. Unfortunately, the thorny problem of bargaining indeterminacy reappears in many of
10According to Efron (1998): the development of modern statistical theory has been a three-sided tug of war between the
Bayesian, frequentist and Fisherian viewpoints. In many ways the Bayesian and frequentist philosophies stand at opposite
poles from each other, with Fishers ideas being somewhat of a compromise.The world of applied statistics seems to need an
e¤ective compromise between Bayesian and frequentist ideas.
11This statement is inspired by the quote from Fisher (1925) presented before the introduction of the paper.
12To adequately represent knowledge, it is important to indicate both what is known and what is (known to be) unknown
(see the quote from Analects of Confucius presented at the beginning of the paper).
13For original contributions to the large Bayesian literature of this bargaining game, see Sobel and Takahashi (1983), Fuden-
berg, Levine and Tirole (1985), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986), Ausubel and Deneckere (1989a,b).
14See Sutton (1986) for a concise exposition and proof.
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these models usually through the Folk Theoremtype of results for su¢ ciently small but positive discount
rates. In a survey, Rubinstein (1987) made an insightful remark on the state of the artof the literature:
In my opinion, we are far from having a denitive theory of bargaining with incomplete
information for use in economic theory. The problems go deeper than bargaining theory and
appear in the literature of renement of S.E. [i.e., Sequential Equilibrium or Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium15 for that matter], an issue explored thoroughly in the last few years. My intuition
is that something is basically wrong in our approach to games with incomplete information and
that the state of the artof bargaining reects our more general confusion.
The di¢ cult problem of rening perfect Bayesian equilibrium remains unresolved. The issue centers
on whether the famous Coase Conjecture the outcome in which an apparent monopolist seller loses her
bargaining power entirely in the face of incomplete information and diminishing discount rate should obtain,
or whether it can be reversed by a continuum of reputation equilibria that help alleviate the commitment
problem that causes the Coase Conjecture. Revealingly, the prominent equilibrium renement criterion
Markov perfection, which eliminates all reputation equilibria in the context of sequential bargaining (on the
ground of lacking simplicity) seems obviously objectionable. When the incompleteness of information is
recognized as much more severe than the conventional Bayesian model can represent e.g., reaching complete
ignorance the nature of potential bargaining indeterminacy changes. Our contribution to this literature
is the nding that the epistemic under-determination of probabilistic belief adds a previously unrecognized
and more generic cause of (potential) bargaining indeterminacy. Furthermore, this seeming curse turns
out to a blessing in disguise we nd a novel justication for using the criterion of Markov perfect to
rene equilibrium, which can suitably resolve this type of bargaining indeterminacy. As a result, we obtain
a unique solution to the bargaining problem. This solution results in competitive outcome similar to the
Coase Conjecture, but it does not require the discount rate to approach zero. Also, it is robust to reversion
that may be caused by a reputation equilibrium.
The paper is organized in eight sections. Section 2 describes the illustrative model of sequential bar-
gaining that forms the basis of our analysis. Section 3 explains formally what we mean by ambiguity, and
how the uninformed player makes likelihood inferences and updates beliefs; and describes the criteria for
decision making under ambiguity. Section 4 denes the Perfect Objectivist Equilibrium and establishes
the foundations including renement for characterizing it in our illustrative model. Sections 5 proceeds
through two steps to characterize Markov Perfect Objectivist Equilibrium. To build the preliminaries for
the main analysis, we rst characterize a benchmark model with complete information. We then establish
the existence and uniqueness of a Markov perfect objectivist equilibrium. In Section 6, we illustrate the (po-
tential) problem of bargaining indeterminacy by establishing the multiplicity of POE, and provide a (novel)
justication for using MPOE as an equilibrium renement. In Section 7 we compare the insights of the cur-
rent model with its counterpart: perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Particularly, we highlight the main results in
relation to the famous Coase Conjecture, and introduce a New Coase Conjecturewhich is based on the
MPOE analysis. Section 8 begins with a summary, we then make some concluding remarks; particularly, we
draw a striking implication about the plausibility of secular stagnation in a post-crisis era it is based on the
15 In this paper, our discussion is focused on a closely related solution concept Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to which
Rubinsteins comments also apply.
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analysis of ambiguity and the New Coase Conjecture their impact on bargaining power, monopoly rent
(Schumpeterian entrepreneurial prot), innovation and growth. Proofs of all results are in the Appendix.
2 Sequential Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information
Consider a sequential bargaining game in which a seller has the exclusive right to make an o¤er to produce
and sell a single unit of a good at a price wt to a buyer, whose valuation of the good, B ; is his private
information and thus his type is denoted by  2 [0; 1].16 If the o¤er price wt is accepted, trade occurs and the
game ends; otherwise, the seller can revise (or maintain) the o¤er in the next period. Trading with a buyer
who values the good, or the underlying technology, yields to the seller a positive externality of magnitude
S . Such positive externality can be in forms of technology spillover or surplus unappropriated by the
buyer. The production cost is a > 0 for the seller. To make an interesting economic problem, we maintain
the following assumption which says for the highest possible type buyer, the trade is socially worthwhile.
Assumption 1 B > 0; S > 0 and B + S > a.
The buyer has the following static utility function for period t = 0; 1; : : ::
vt = (B   wt) kt; (1)
and the sellers static utility is
ut = (S + wt   a) kt; (2)
where wt 2 W := [ S ;B ] is the price o¤ered by the seller in period t; kt 2 K := f0; 1g is buyers decision
in period t; with kt = 1 denoting acceptance and kt = 0; rejection. Both wt and kt are commonly observable.
The game continues from period t to period t+ 1 if and only if the indicator of trade Kt :=
Pt
=0 kt = 0.
Denote by Ht = HtS HtB the set of all possible histories from period 0 till t as long as the game has not
ended by t, where
HtS :=
n
f(w ; k )gt 1=0 jw 2 W; k 2 K
o
;
HtB =
n
; f(w ; k )gt 1=0 ; wt

jw ; wt 2 W; k 2 K
o
;
t = 0; 1; : : :.17 The realized history is given by ht = (htS ; h
t
B) 2 Ht, where htS = f(w ; k )gt 1=0 2 HtS and
htB =

; f(w ; k )gt 1=0 ; wt

2 HtB are the information accessible to the seller and buyer respectively.
A pure strategy for the seller is the function sS : HtS ! W for t = 0; 1; : : : (such that the game has not
ended by t); while sB : HtB ! K for t = 0; 1; : : : is the counterpart for the buyer. A pure strategy prole
s = (sS ; sB) is a map
s : Ht !W K; for t = 0; 1; : : : :
For brevity and without loss of clarity, we write sS (ht) (and respectively sB (ht)) instead of sS (htS) (and
respectively sB (htB)). Notice that sS () (and respectively sB ()) is only measurable in HtS (and respectively
16This formulation uses two parameters  and B . Since B is a parameter which denotes the upper bound of the valuation,
it is without loss of generality that  has the range of [0; 1].
17Throughout the paper, we use subscript t to index playersactions taken in given period t, while we use superscript t to
index histories of actions up to (excluding) the playersrespective actions in period t.
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HtB). Thus, the sellers move sS (ht) 2 W does not depend on parameter , which is not contained in htS .
In contrast, the buyers strategy is a function of . Note that the seller moves rst at the beginning of each
period to o¤er wt, which is observed by the buyer in his turn to move. So wt is contained in htB while kt
is not contained in htS , an asymmetry reecting the sequential relation between wt and kt. The seller can
commit to wt in period t, but the buyer cannot commit to a specic response prior to observing wt but is
motivated to play the best response. This asymmetry gives the seller a rst-mover advantage. The buyers
potential advantage is his hidden information about , which is contained in htB but not in h
t
S :
Let SS := fsS : HtS !Wjt = 0; 1; : : :g and SB := fsB : HtB ! Kjt = 0; 1; : : :g be the sets of all possible
pure strategies of the seller and the buyer respectively, and let S := SS  SB denote the set of all pure
strategy proles.
The buyers type space is  := [0; 1]. The sellers belief about  is inferred from observational data on
history htS according to an endogenous set of inference rules. The sellers set of inference rules within an
equilibrium of the game involves a description of that equilibrium. Therefore there exist multiple sets of
inference rules across multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes; but within each pure strategy equilibrium, there
is a unique set of inference rules consistent with that pure strategy equilibrium. The posterior set of inferred
types of buyer may (partially) preserve the ambiguity about  originated from the multiple priors. That is
to say, the inference from observational data on history htS may allow only partial identication of  2 .
3 Ambiguity in a Dynamic Game
With multiple priors, the sequential bargaining game embodies ambiguity. We start by laying the ground
work for modeling ambiguity in two steps. First, we develop the analytical approach for how a seller with
multiple priors would learn over time. We do so by formulating the sellers multiple prior probabilistic beliefs
over the buyers private type  2  and then explaining the likelihood inference process that the seller uses
to update her multiple probabilistic beliefs. Second, we specify the sellers objective in light of the ambiguity
she faces, and indicate what it means for the seller to follow an optimal strategy.
3.1 Interactive Learning under Ambiguity
3.1.1 The Sellers Multiple Priors Over 
Each of the sellers multiple priors over  2  is a (countably additive) probability measure, a set function
0 :  ()! [0; 1], where  () is the Borel -algebra over the buyer type space . To make the illustration
stark, we make the extreme assumption that the seller is completely ignorant about what the true prior
is, therefore entertains the set of all priors, denoted by M0 := 4 ( ()).18 We also make the standard
assumption that the seller is an expected utility maximizer when she knows the true unique probability
measure. For any random variable or real-valued function g : (; () ; ) ! R such that g is Borel-
measurable and bounded, the (mathematical) expectation of g under  2 4 ( ()) is well dened as the
Lebesgue integral:
E [g] :=
Z

gd: (3)
18The measure-theoretic formulation allows great generality, so that each  2 M0 can be either a continuous or a discrete
distribution, or a convex combination of both.
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When  is a Dirac measure (i.e., an indicator function), for any A 2  () we have
 (A) =  (A) := 1A () :=
(
1 if  2 A;
0 otherwise;
(4)
and
E [g] = E [g] = g () : (5)
Since the state space  = [0; 1] is a set of real numbers, in general we can dene a -induced cumulative
distribution function F (x) :=  (( 1; x]) for all x 2 .19 Thus, F (x) is everywhere well-dened. It is non-
decreasing, right-continuous, F (0 ) = 0 and F (1) = 1. So E [g] can be rewritten as a Lebesgue-Stieltjes
integral:
E [g] =
Z 1
0
gdF: (6)
Notice that
R 1
0
gdF agrees with the Riemann-Stieltjes integral whenever the latter is dened. Particularly,
for applications where F (x) is continuously di¤erentiable and therefore there exists a continuous probability
density function f (x) :=
dF(x)
dx , if g (x) is continuous then E [g] equals the well-dened Riemann integral:
E [g] =
Z 1
0
[g (x) f (x)] dx: (7)
3.1.2 Equilibrium and Likelihood Inference
The sellers inference about the (unobservable) type of the buyer from observation has two phases. First,
an inference from each given type of the buyer to a (deduced) history of the game on the premise of a
putative equilibrium path determines a likelihood function. The second phase is an inference running from
an observed history to a posterior characterization of types of the buyer by prior-by-prior Bayesian updating
on the basis of the likelihood function. The likelihood function, denoted by l, which plays the central role in
the sellers learning process, is determined by the common knowledge among the players about the structure
of the game. Dene the function l : HtSS! [0; 1] such that l (; s; ) is a conditional probability function
over HtS . The argument s is a putative pure strategy equilibrium in question. For example, l (htS ; s; ) is
the probability of history htS conditional on (the assumption) (s; ), that is, the data h
t
S is generated by
the equilibrium s with buyer type .20 Notice that l (htS ; s; ) is the likelihood of the parameter value of ;
and, importantly, l (htS ; s; ) is neither a probability measure over , nor dependent of an prior probability
measure  2M0.
In this paper, we conne our theoretical construct and analysis to the special case of pure strategy
equilibrium s, on the premise of which the seller can deduce a unique history from the hypothesis . We
therefore have l (htS ; s; ) = 0 for all h
t
S 2 HtS except for one unique history. Conversely, given s, the seller
can (partially) identify from the observed history htS the types of the buyer that are consistent with the
19Observe that  is also the unique Lebesgue-Stieltjes measure induced by the cumulative distribution function F (x).
Particularly,  ((a; b]) = F (b)  F (a) for 0  a < b  1 and  (fbg) = F (b)  F (b ). (See Royden, 1988, chapter 12.3 for
a textbook treatment.)
20Thus, l
 
htS ; s; 

does not obey the laws of probability when htS is xed and  is treated as a variable, e.g., the integration
over  does not add up to one. That is why we use the term likelihoodas opposed to probability.Likelihood measures the
evidential support for parameter value  from data htS conditional on the assumption of s.
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history.
Within each putative pure strategy equilibrium s, the likelihood inference is conditioned on the assump-
tion that the observed history is on the equilibrium path of s. This is captured by the fact that the conditional
likelihood function l (htS ; s; ) : ! [0; 1] depends on argument s.
The deduction of the history from the assumption of (s; ) can be represented by the map   : S! H1S
such that for 8 (s; ) 2 S ,   (s; ) = h1S 2 H1S predicts an entire (seller-observable part of) equilibrium
path of the game (conditional on the game having not ended). Let  t (s; ) be the restriction of   (s; ) to the
set (of periods) f0; 1; : : : ; tg. Therefore,  t (s; ) predicts the (seller-observable part of) on-equilibrium-path
history htS 2 Ht. This part of reasoning is hypothetico-deductive inference, and it determines the unique
likelihood function l such that
l
 
htS ; s; 

= 1 t(s;)
 
htS

:=
(
1 if htS =  
t (s; )
0 otherwise
; (8)
where 1 t(s;) (htS) is a indicator function.
21
Conversely, from the seller-observed history of the game htS , the seller can (partially) identify the plausible
types of the buyer. Dene the (partial) identication correspondence, I : HtS S ! (), such that for any
htS 2 HtS and s 2 S,
I  htS ; s :=  2 j t (s; ) = htS	 : (9)
The set I (htS ; s) is the updated (plausible) type space of the buyer.22 We conne our attention to well-
behaved pure strategy equilibrium s such that I (htS ; s) 2  ().23 Since I (htS ; s) is rarely a singleton, the
identication is usually partial.24 In typical applications, the set I (htS ; s) is an interval, in which case the
inmum and supremum of I (htS ; s), denoted by inf (I (htS ; s)) and sup (I (htS ; s)) are the boundary points of
the (updated) buyer type space.
Conditional on the assumption that the pure strategy equilibrium s is the underlying data generating
mechanism, we can treat I (htS ; s) 2  () as the conditioning event upon which the seller update her belief.
3.1.3 Belief Updating
Since the seller is the only uninformed player in the game who has to make inferences about the opponents
type, the (inference-related) likelihood function l (; s; ) and identication correspondence I (; s) are only
measurable in HtS instead of Ht. Therefore without causing confusion and for the sake of brevity, for the
rest of the paper we will drop subscript S and write htS and HtS simply as ht and Ht.
If the seller entertains a unique prior 0, belief updating will simply follow BayesRule, using history h
t
21This feature of the likelihood being degenerated to an indicator function is caused by the connement of the analysis to
pure strategy equilibrium.
22Thus, a pure strategy equilibrium denes an endogenous ltration (sequential partition of the state space), which determines
the information structure of the interactive learning under ambiguity. This is in contrast with the non-interactive learning under
ambiguity modelled by Epstein and Schneider (2003), where the ltration is exogenously given.
23Practically this (technical) assumption is always satised. Intuitively, this assumption requires that the (pure strategy)
equilibrium must not be so complicated (or contrived) that it induces pathological (partial) identication (by the standard of
Borel measurability).
24The term partial identication is borrowed from Manski (1995). In the current context, the pure strategy prole-based
inferential problem is abstracted from the statistical inference problem, and therefore is purely a problem of identication a la
Manski (1995).
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as the conditioning event. Denote by t (jht;0; s) 2 4 ( ()) the posterior probability measure. From
BayesRule, we have
t
 Ajht;0; l = RA l (ht; s; ) d0R 1
0
l (ht; s; ) d0
; for 8A 2 () ; (10)
where the numerator (of the right-hand side of the equation) is the probability of the joint event that the
observed history is ht and the buyer type is  2 A, and the denominator is the probability of the event that
the observed history is ht. Given the special restriction that s is a pure strategy equilibrium, the information
contained in the history is su¢ ciently summarized by the updated buyer type space I (ht; s), which, as an
equivalent conditioning event to the history ht, can be used for Bayesian updating as follows:
t
 Ajht;0; s = 0 (A \ I (ht; s))0 (I (ht; s)) : (11)
Note, the posterior is well dened only if the denominator 0 (I (ht; s)) is positive.
As a key di¤erence from a conventional Bayesian dynamic game, the seller is not epistemically committed
to any particular single prior as she entertains multiple priors. Consequently she also entertains multiple
posteriors the Bayesian updates based on all her priors. LetMt (ht; s) denote the set of all her posteriors,
which is dened by
Mt
 
ht; s

:=

t
 jht;0; s j0 2M0	 ; (12)
where t (jht;0; s) is determined by (10). This is called prior-by-prior Bayesian updating, or Full Bayesian
Updating (FBU).25 .
Since we assume that the seller is completely ignorant about the true prior probability measure, her set
of priors M0 thus does not exclude any possible prior, meaning it is thus the largest set possible. In this
case, the belief updating turns out to be extremely simple, as is shown by the next proposition, the seller has
complete ignorance about the true probability measure over the updated buyer type space I (ht; s) 2  ().
Proposition 1 Suppose s is the strategy prole of a pure-strategy equilibrium such that the updated buyer
type space is given by I (ht; s) 2  () for all history ht 2 Ht, all t = 0; 1; : : :. For any history ht such that
I (ht; s) 6= ?, the set of posteriors is given by
Mt
 
ht; s

=

0 2M0j0
 I  ht; s = 1	 ; (13)
i.e., the set of posteriors is the set of all possible probability measures whose supports are included in the
updated type space I (ht; s).
So far we have only dealt with histories ht such that I (ht; s) 6= ?, which is a necessary condition for
on-equilibrium path histories. For any history ht such that I (ht; s) = ? (which implies 0 (I (ht; s)) = 0
for all 0 2M0), the equilibrium-paths-based identication process fails and indicates that the history is o¤
the equilibrium paths. To complete the updating of beliefs for such histories, we impose the following basic
assumption.
25The latter term is borrowed from Gilboa and Marinacci (2011), which is a recent comprehensive survey of the ambiguity
literature.
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Assumption 2 If a history ht 2 Ht is such that l (ht; s; ) = 0 for all  2  (i.e., I (ht; s) = ? 2  ()),
thenMt (ht; s) is given by
Mt
 
ht; s

=M0: (14)
This assumption captures the idea that the identication failure (i.e., I (ht; s) = ?) indicates that the
data ht is (known to be) generated by o¤-equilibrium path behavior, which implies that the equilibrium-
paths-based likelihood function is not valid for explaining the data. As a result, learning or belief-updating
based on the invalid likelihood function should be undone, and the beliefs should revert to the initial priors.
The seller maintains complete ignorance about the true probability measure over the original buyer type
space .
Overall, the key to belief updating is the updating of the buyer type space. In a pure strategy equilibrium,
the seller always remains agnostic about the true probability measure over the (plausible) buyer type space,
unless it degenerates to a singleton.
3.2 Sellers Objective and Best Response
In Bayesian games in which a player has a unique prior probability measure about the state of the world,
the specication of the players objective is straightforward: conditional on the history of play, the player
forms a mathematical expectation of the payo¤ it seeks to maximize based on the posterior beliefs implied
by that history. However, if the player does not have a unique prior, the formulation of the players objective
is more complex. Our specication of the sellers objective is inspired by Manski (2008) and GMMS (2010).
These papers deal with the situation faced by the seller in our model: what are the criteria for decision
making under uncertainty when the decision maker lacks the information to quantify uncertainty using
a single probability measure? Manski (2008) formulates a two-step procedure in which the rst step is
to eliminate all weakly-dominated actions, and the second step is to maximize the minimum expected
utility function or minimize the maximum regret function (over non-weakly-dominated actions). GMMS
(2010) axiomatize the problem of a decision maker who has a pair of preference relations: objectively
rational preferences and subjectively rational preferences. If the decision maker chooses on the basis of
objectively rational preferences, he can solidly justifyand hence defend his choice to others because these
preferences do not depend on her personal taste over ambiguity; if the decision maker chooses on the basis of
subjectively rational preferences, he cannot be convinced by others that his choice was wrong because these
preferences depend on her personal taste over ambiguity in a way that is regarded as subjectively rational.
Objectively rational preferences generate a unanimous but incomplete ordering of actions, while subjectively
rational preferences generate a complete ordering of actions that can be represented by a minimum expected
utility function (with respect to all priors in the set of the decision makers possible priors). GMMS (2010)
demonstrate that given two plausible conditions (consistency and caution), there exists a common set of
priors that can be used to represent both the objectively rational preferences and the subjectively rational
preferences of the decision maker. This provides an epistemically intuitive interpretation for decision making
based on the max-min rule. Basing decisions on a minimum expected utility function can be thought of as
a way of completing an otherwise incomplete preference ordering based on objective rationality.
Our formulation is a slight variant of GMMS (2010) and applied to a dynamic game-theoretic setting. To
develop this formulation, we dene, derive, and characterize the sellers inmum expected utility function
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which we call the worst-case value function. To begin, note that the sellers static conditional utility for
s^ 2 S (conditional on ) is in general given by
u (s^; ) = (S + w (s^; )  a) k (s^; ) : (15)
The sellers conditional value function in general can thus be expressed as
Wt (s^; ) =
P1
=t u (s^; ) (1 + r)
 ( t)
1K 1=0
= ut (s^; ) 1Kt 1=0 + (1 + r)
 1
Wt+1 (s^; ) ;
(16)
where 1K 1=0 is the indicator for whether the game continues into period  , and r > 0 is the common
discount rate used by the seller and the buyer.
Generally, we only impose a weak restriction on the pure strategy prole s^ such that Wt (s^; ) must be
Borel-measurable in . Since Wt (s^; ) is bounded, its expectation with respect to probability measure 0 is
well dened as has been formulated in section 3.1.1. To maintain a simple and clear interpretation of the
likelihood inference, we formulate the worst-case value function in terms of inmum (in stead of minimum)
of expected payo¤. This greater generality removes the necessity for proof of existence of the minimum.26
We can now dene the sellers worst-case value function:
Denition 1 The sellers worst-case value function Ut (s^;ht; s) is the inmum of the sellers expected value
for s^ 2 S, given the history ht, the pure strategy prole s 2 S and the set of plausible probabilistic beliefs
Mt (ht; s), i.e.,
Ut
 
s^;ht; s

:= inf
2Mt(ht;s)
Z 1
0
Wt (s^; ) d: (17)
To characterize the sellers best response conditional on her set of plausible beliefs, we begin by dening
what it means for one pure strategy prole to weakly dominate another from the sellers perspective:
Denition 2 For a pair of pure strategy proles s^; s 2 S, the prole s^ weakly dominates s conditional on
Mt (ht; s) denoted by s^ Mt(ht;s) s i¤Z 1
0
Wt (s^; ) d 
Z 1
0
Wt (s; ) d;
for all  2Mt (ht; s) and Z 1
0
Wt (s^; ) d >
Z 1
0
Wt (s; ) d;
for some  2Mt (ht; s).
26As a simple mathematical fact, the inmum (of the expected payo¤) equals the minimum if the latter exists. The standard
way to ensure the existence of the minimum would be to represent the ambiguous beliefs with the closure of the convex hull of
Mt
 
ht; s

instead ofMt
 
ht; s

itself. This transformation would complicate the epistemic interpretation of likelihood inference
and belief updating. From an epistemic point of view, there is no reason why the set of probabilistic beliefs has to be compact.
In fact, for example, in our sequential bargaining model, it is possible for Mt
 
ht; s

to be the set of all (Borel measurable)
probability measures whose supports are included in [0; ) for some  2 (0; 1) and t = 1; 2; : : :; both Mt
 
ht; s

and its
support [0; ) are not compact, since  is a limit point of [0; ) but not included in it, and the Dirac measure  is a
limit point ofMt
 
ht; s

but not included therein either.
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We can now dene the sellers set of pure strategy best responses:
Denition 3 For a given Mt (ht; s) and buyer strategy sB 2 SB, the sellers set of all best responses
conditional onMt (ht; s) is given by
SS
 
sB ;Mt
 
ht; s

:=
(
s^S 2 SS
 s^S 2 arg maxs0S2SS Ut (s0S ; sB ;ht; s) and(s; sB) Mt(ht;s) (s^; sB) ;8sS 2 SS
)
;
where (sS ; sB) Mt(ht;s) (s^S ; sB) expresses the negation of (sS ; sB) Mt(ht;s) (s^S ; sB).
Given the buyers strategy sB 2 SB and the sellers belief represented byMt (ht; s), the sellers objective
is to play one of her best responses ~sS 2 SS (sB ;Mt (ht; s)). By denition of a best response, the worst-case
value of strategy ~sS must be the maximum in comparison with all alternative strategies in SS . If there
are multiple strategies that have the maximum worst-case value, then ~sS also must not be conditionally
weakly dominated by any alternative strategy in SS (conditional on Mt (ht; s)).27 For this reason, the
sellers preferences are lexicographical because they cannot entirely be represented by a utility function
(such as the inmum expected utility function). Notice that our formulation of the sellers preferences
gives a signicance to weak dominance (among the objectively rational preferences). To see this, note that
if strategies s^S ; sS 2 SS have the same inmum expected value, but s^S conditionally weakly dominates
sS , then the seller must not be indi¤erent between s^S and sS ; instead, she must strictly prefer s^S to sS .
Consequently, the conditionally weakly dominated strategy sS cannot be optimal. This criterion might help
to reduce the multiplicity of best responses if they exist.
Before turning to an analysis of equilibrium, we specify the buyers value function. Using (1), the buyers
value function in general is given by
Vt (s; ) =
P1
=t v (s; ) (1 + r)
 ( t)
1K 1=0
= vt (s; ) 1Kt 1=0 + (1 + r)
 1
Vt+1 (s; ) :
(18)
4 Solution Concept
4.1 Perfect Objectivist Equilibrium (POE)
Our solution concept is an extension of the familiar perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) to a setting in which
the uninformed player is allowed to entertain multiple priors. We call it the perfect objectivist equilibrium
(POE). The term objectivistis to emphasize that the ambiguity in the probabilistic beliefs is entailed by
epistemic objectivity when there is insu¢ cient information to uniquely determine the probabilistic belief as
prescribed by the PBE.
Denition 4 A POE of the game is a tuple (s;M (s)), whereM (s) represents the beliefs of the seller such
that
M (s) =Mt  ht; s jht 2 Ht; t = 0; 1; : : :	 ;
27 In the Appendix, we provide an example of a weakly dominated strategy which satises the max-inf expected utility
criterion. However, to understand the example, one must rst understand the equilibrium analysis developed in Section 5. For
this reason, the example is presented immediately after the proof of Theorem 1.
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and s = (sS ; sB) is the pure strategy prole represented by a map
s : Ht !W K; for all t = 0; 1; : : :
such that,
(i) Both sS and sB are sequentially rational, namely, for any period t = 0; 1; : : : and realized history ht,
given the conditional posteriors Mt (ht; s), the continuation strategies derived from sB and sS are mutual
best responses. That is,
sS 2 SP
 
sB ;Mt
 
ht; s

;
for allMt (ht; s) such that I (ht; s) 2  (), and
Vt (sS ; sB ; )  Vt (sS ; s0B ; )
for all s0B 2 SB for all  2 :
(ii) The priors are given by M0
 
h0; s

= M0. The belief updating is through the likelihood inference
based on s, which is described in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. Specically, (a) for all t = 1; 2; : : : the set of all
plausible posteriors Mt (ht; s) against any history ht such that I (ht; s) 6= ? is derived from full Bayesian
updating equations (10) and (12) based on likelihood function l (ht; s; ); and (b)Mt (ht; s) =M0 against
any history ht such that I (ht; s) = ?.
In Denition 4, condition (i) requires sequential rationality, that is, given the beliefs t for any given
history (either I (ht; s) 6= ? or not), all subsequent strategies of the seller must be best responses to the
buyers subsequent strategies, and all subsequent strategies of the buyer must be best responses to the sellers
subsequent strategies too.
Condition (ii) requires that belief updating follows the likelihood inference based on the putative
equilibrium s, as is described in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3. In particular, it requires full Bayesian updating
whenever Bayesian updating is feasible, i.e., I (ht; s) 6= ?; and when I (ht; s) = ?, that is, for any history
such that every plausible equilibrium-based prediction of the play of the game is contradicted by the data,
the set of all posteriors reverts to the set of all priors.
Our denition of POE mirrors the denition of PBE, but it di¤ers from the denition of the PBE in
two ways. First, in the POE the sellers strategy must maximize her inmum expected utility over non-
conditionally-weakly-dominated strategies (Denition 3), which addresses the situation of ambiguity and
reects the sellers ambiguity aversion. By contrast, in a PBE, the sellers equilibrium strategy maximizes
her expected utility function given the posterior beliefs that follow from its unique prior beliefs through
Bayesian updating. Second, this (single prior) Bayesian updating is replaced in the POE by likelihood
inference and full Bayesian updating on a set of multiple priors.
4.2 Renement Markov Perfect Objectivist Equilibrium (MPOE)
In the POE, in principle the strategies of the players can depend on the full history ht in period t. This may
permit various complicated strategic interaction (and feedback loops) between players and result in a large
multiplicity of equilibria and diminished predictive power of the game-theoretic model. As a novel contri-
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bution to the study of this issue, we emphasize that epistemic under-determination of probabilistic beliefs
may add a new cause to the problem of multiplicity of equilibria in general, and bargaining indeterminacy
in particular. The call for equilibrium renement therefore has some added urgency.
Applied game theorists conventionally employ the criterion of Markov perfection to tackle the problem
of multiplicity of equilibria . The central idea of this principle is that an equilibrium that is Markov perfect
represents the simplest form of (rational) strategic interaction. In practice, Markov perfection (typically)
requires that actions are conditioned upon the smallest number of commonly known payo¤-relevant state
variables. Reducing the size of the space of states that the players have to keep track of and respond to can
generate cognitive economies. That is, (everything else being equal) playing an equilibrium that is Markov
perfect requires less (scarce) cognitive resources, therefore is more likely to emerge in reality. Given that a
key motivation for inventing the POE solution concept is to emphasize the epistemic (cognitive) impact on
behavior, we nd it appealing to combine POE with Markov perfection whenever it is applicable. We call a
POE which is also Markov perfect a Markov perfect objectivist equilibrium (MPOE).
Methodologically, to solve for MPOE, one can start with a conjectured small set of (commonly known)
state variables which the playersstrategies are conditioned upon. If there exist multiple POE formulated
in terms of these state contingent strategies, then one can rene the equilibrium by reducing the numbers of
(commonly known) state variables upon which POE still exist(s). It is necessary that MPOE is such a POE
that further reduction of state variables is impossible.
5 Characterization of MPOE
In this sequential bargaining model, there is a clear list of candidate state variables for an MPOE. They
include wt and , which are payo¤-relevant for the buyer. Although  a¤ects the sellers payo¤, it is not
known to the seller, so she cannot condition her strategy on . We therefore will start with a candidate
MPOE for which the buyers strategy is formulated in terms of state variables (wt; ), and the sellers strategy
is independent of state variables. Because the set of commonly known state variables is empty and cannot
be reduced further, this candidate equilibrium will be an MPOE if it is proven to be a POE.
To isolate the e¤ect of asymmetric information, we rst consider a benchmark case in which the seller
knows the buyers type . This benchmark analysis will highlight how information can allow the seller to
leverage her exogenous right of making all o¤ers into the endogenous bargaining power of hers.
5.1 The Benchmark: Seller Knows 
From a social planners perspective, B + S represents the maximum social surplus from trade. Dene
 := aB+S to be the type of the buyer that would make a social planner just indi¤erent between
sanctioning trade and not. Since for any  2 [0; ) it is the case that  (B + S) < a that is, the social
surplus from trade is negative and trade does not occur in any SPNE. There exist many SPNE with an
outcome of no trade, for example, wt 2 [B ;B ] and kt = 0. Such multiplicity of SPNE is trivial and
uninteresting. Thus we will focus on the case with  2 (; 1].
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Proposition 2 Suppose the buyers type is  2 (; 1], which is common knowledge. Then there exists a
unique SPNE, in which the sellers strategy is
w () = B (19)
and the buyers strategy is
k (wt; ) =
(
1 if wt  B ;
0 otherwise.
(20)
On equilibrium path there is always trade between the seller and the buyer. This SPNE is Pareto e¢ cient.
We can dene the bargaining power of a player in this bargaining game as her (or his) ability to carry
out her (or his) preferred term of transaction despite the (potential or actual) resistance of the opponent.
Naturally, each players most preferred term of transaction subject to that trade occurs voluntarily is the
one that maximizes her (or his) surplus from trade. In this sequential bargaining game, the seller has the
right to make all o¤ers, which is an exogenously endowed advantage in the bargaining game. For the simple
case of perfect knowledge and positive discount rate r, the unique SPNE price w () = B is indeed the
most preferred by the seller i.e., the seller has all of the total surplus from a Pareto-e¢ cient trade so
we can say she has full bargaining power. Furthermore, the seller has su¢ cient information to assess her
bargaining power, and she knows that her bargaining strategy allows her to achieve full bargaining power.
In essence, this result corresponds to a rst-degree price discrimination by a monopoly seller, which can be
achieved only under complete information.
5.2 MPOE: Existence and Uniqueness
Theorem 1 There exists a unique MPOE, denoted by (s;M (s)). In this MPOE, the seller o¤ers the
price:
sB
 
ht

= w := B for t = 0; 1; : : : ; (21)
and the buyers strategy is
sS
 
ht

= k (wt; ) =
(
1 if B   wt  maxf0; 11+r (B   w)g;
0 otherwise,
(22)
or equivalently
sS
 
ht

= k (wt; ) =
(
1 if   max
n
wt
B
; ^ (wt)
o
;
0 otherwise,
(23)
where ^ (wt) =
(1+r)wt w
rB
is the cut-o¤ type of the buyer who is indi¤erent between buying now at price wt
or buying at price w in the next period. On an equilibrium path the buyer buys if and only if he is of type
 2 [; 1]. In the limit, the MPOE price tends to the cost, i.e., w ! a as S ! 0.28
28Note, as a main result of the current paper, this theorem is sensitive to the assumption of positive S . Under the alternative
assumption S = 0, we have w = a. By always o¤ering the price w = a, the sellers payo¤ is always be zero. This strategy
is weakly-dominated by the strategy of always o¤ering price a + ", for some small " > 0, which gives a payo¤ of at least zero,
and strictly positive under some plausible beliefs, e.g., the prior  for  = 1. So under the alternative assumption S = 0, the
propositional content of this theorem will be false.
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The MPOE entails the seller o¤ering the same price w each period. That price coincides with the price
that an uninformed social planner would set in a static setting i.e., it is the price that induces a buyer to
purchase if and only if the net social benet from trade is non-negative. We can interpret the o¤er price
w = a   S as a cost-minuscontract in which the seller essentially o¤ers the product to the buyer
at costminus a Pigouvian-like subsidy S , which is intended to induce the buyer to internalize the
externality. In other words, the seller in the MPOE acts in the same way that a static social planner would
act, taking into account the positive externality through Pigouvian subsidization.
Under the limiting condition: S ! 0 i.e., as the positive externality becomes innitesimal the time
path of price o¤er is a at line at the competitive price a. Note that the game of seller o¤er sequential
bargaining with one-sided incomplete information is well known to embed the Coase Problem the limits
on monopoly power created by monopolists own future competition which is based on the insight that the
future self of the seller cannot commit to not undercutting her current price o¤er unless it is already at the
cost level a. It implies that the time path of the price o¤er is either a price deation process, or a at line at
the level of a. Now we see that the criterion of Markov perfection seems to have selected the latter against
the former for the reason of simplicity.
The uniqueness of the MPOE is a striking result. It denies the possibility that the price o¤er is a at line
at a higher level w > w. The cause of this outcome is the same as the cause of the Coase problem the
sellers inability to commit her future self to not undercutting the current price w. To see why, note that after
w is rejected, the seller must infer from the rejection that the buyers type is such that given his strategy the
price w is not acceptable. As is shown in detail in the proof of Theorem 1, with the updated belief about the
buyer type, while the constant price w means no trade will occur ex post, a deviation to the price w will,
guarantee a non-negative expected payo¤ for the seller, and conditional on some posterior beliefs also
allow trade to occur and give the seller positive surplus from trade. Therefore every at line of price o¤er at
a higher price w > w is ex post weakly dominated, and consequently the seller has no ability to commit
to it because it is not sequentially rational.
A comparison between Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 sheds important light on the e¤ect of information or
the lack of information on a¤ecting the endogenous distribution of bargaining power. Recall that the seller,
who is endowed with the exogenous right to make all o¤ers, has the upper hand she gains full bargaining
power when bargaining under complete information. If her complete information about buyer type is
replaced by complete ignorance, then, as predicted by the unique MPOE, the buyer has the upper hand in
the bargaining even full bargaining power for the limiting case S ! 0 although the seller still keeps her
(exogenous) right to make all the o¤ers. Clearly, it takes adequate information for the seller to leverage the
exogenously endowed bargaining advantage e.g., the right to make all o¤ers into endogenous bargaining
power. Thus, the possession of private information under severe informational asymmetry does seem to be
a source of signicant bargaining power. In the model the seller has severe information disadvantage, as is
represented by her ambiguous probabilistic beliefs about buyer type. Because of the complete ignorance of
the seller about buyer type, the seller has insu¢ cient information to carry out any meaningful assessment
of her bargaining power. Notice that she cannot even calculate her expected payo¤ from her bargaining
strategy because she cannot determine a unique prior probability measure upon which the expected payo¤
can be dened. Since she cannot carry out an unambiguous assessment of her bargaining power, she cannot
be meaningfully motivated to maximize her bargaining power. As a result, she has no obstacle (based on a
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concern about bargaining power) to the pragmatic pursuit of cognitive economies, and she should be willing
to coordinate on equilibrium selection through the criterion of Markov perfection.
The buyer knows that the seller lacks incentive to experiment with higher prices to enhance her bargaining
power. Therefore, this can epistemically and strategically induce the buyer to form a deationary expectation
in the face of high prices (i.e., wt > w). The e¤ect of this deationary expectation can be demonstrated
dramatically from the buyers cut-o¤ strategy (23). If the price exceeds a certain threshold, i.e., wt >
w + r(B w
)
1+r , then the cut-o¤ type is ^ (wt) > 1, implying the price will be rejected by all buyer types
in expectation of a price deation in the next period from wt to w. This kind of strategic resistance to a
high price by the buyer under the inuence of a deationary expectation certainly does not encourage the
seller to experiment with higher prices, but can strengthen the force of cognitive economies in facilitating
a coordinated selection of the MPOE strategies. This is consistent with our novel argument for the use of
Markov perfection for equilibrium renement, which applies particularly when there exist multiplicity of POE
associated with multiplicity of probabilistic beliefs. In the next section, we elaborate on these multiplicities.
6 Potential Bargaining Indeterminacy and Renement
6.1 Multiplicity of POE
So far our equilibrium analysis of the sequential bargaining has been founded upon equilibrium renement
through Markov perfection. In the following, we approach this non-trivial issue of renement by establishing
two crucial points. First, there exists a multiplicity of POE and hence a potential for bargaining indetermi-
nacy, which calls for renement. Second, the renement criterion Markov perfection is justied in a way
immune to some well-argued objections informed by the related literature.
To start, under multiplicity of prior probability measures, the problem of optimal risk-taking is ambigu-
ously dened. This can make the uninformed decision maker indi¤erent among multiplicity of solutions that
can be justied among ambiguous beliefs. The following proposition establishes that there exists a continuum
of POE for r > 0 (nitely).29
Proposition 3 For any w0 2 [w; w], where w := w + r(B w
)
1+r 2 (w;B), there exists a POE such
that w0 is the sellers initial price o¤er at t = 0. In a strategy prole which can support this POE outcome,
the sellers strategy is given by:
w (t) =
(
w0 for t = 0;
w otherwise,
(24)
and the buyer plays the following cut-o¤ strategy:
k (wt; ) =
(
1 if   max
n
wt
B
; ^ (wt)
o
;
0 otherwise,
(25)
where ^ (wt) =
(1+r)wt w
rB
.
29For our purpose of establishing the existence of multiplicity of POE, we do not need to and do not claim that the continuum
of POE specied in Proposition 3 include the full spectrum of POE. For example, the following proposition does not claim to
rule out any POE which has its initial price o¤er in the interval ( w;B ].
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Intuitively, the exclusive right to make o¤ers if combined with perfect knowledge of the buyers type
allows the seller to make the price o¤er such that the buyer is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting, and
thus extracts maximum surplus from the buyer without causing costly rejection. This is what Proposition 2
says. In contrast, the seller who is completely ignorant about the buyers type risks causing costly rejection
by o¤ering high prices. Furthermore, the severe lack of information prevents the seller from assessing the
risks objectively, and therefore permits her to entertain the possibilities of either high or low risks arbitrarily,
simply because of her ambiguous beliefs over the buyer type.
Technically, the multiplicity of priors that represents the ambiguity gives the seller a fat indi¤erence
curvedespite of the restrictiveness of the mix-inf expected utility criterion of choice. This fat indi¤erence
curveadmits a multiplicity of best responses on the sellers behalf to the same strategy of the buyer. To see
this in sharp focus, notice that all the multiple POE explicitly specied in Proposition 3 have the same buyer
strategy as given by (25), which is identical to the buyer strategy in the unique MPOE as specied by (23).
The multiplicity of seller strategies specied by (24) as well as in the unique MPOE are best responses to
this same buyer strategy, and they constitute this multiplicity of POE. The insight of this observation is that
we can precisely identify ambiguity the multiplicity of priors as a cause of this (particular) multiplicity
of POE, through the transmission mechanism of the fat indi¤erence curve. For the same reason the
multi-prior-induced fat indi¤erence curve the seller is also indi¤erent among all the multiplicity of POE
ex ante at the level of individual rationality.
6.2 Cognitive Economies as an Equilibrium Selection Force When Does It
Work?
The analysis in the pervious section thus calls for equilibrium renement in order to tackle the problem of
bargaining indeterminacy. Among the multiplicity of POE bargaining outcomes, some are less demanding
on cognitive e¤ort to acquire, store and process information about the state of the game than others. The
unique MPOE outcome the at line of price o¤er at the level w is actually the cognitively simplest and
most economical among the continuum of POE the other POE all involve some more complex process of
price deation. Since the seller is indi¤erent among the multiplicity of POE (at the individual rationality
level), the cognitive economies can be seen as a secondary benet(at the collective equilibrium selection
level) for the seller to break the tieand be willing to select the unique MPOE among the multiplicity of
POE.30
To anticipate Theorem 3 that will be presented in Section 7.1, it is well known that from the literature
on (seller o¤er) sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information (Sobel and Takahashi 1983,
Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole 1985, Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson 1986, Ausubel and Deneckere 1989a,
1989b) that Markov perfection blocks the reputation equilibria, which are a main cause of multiplicity
of equilibria and potential bargaining indeterminacy. In comparison with the Markov perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (MPBE), the sellers most preferred reputation equilibrium can best enhance her bargaining
power against the buyer. This gives the seller an incentive not to coordinate on playing the MPBE, which
has the benet of cognitive economies but is not favorable in terms of bargaining power. In this context, the
30This secondary benetdoes not a¤ect the choice at the individual rationality level, therefore does not a¤ect the denition
of POE.
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argument for giving cognitive economies a decisive role of equilibrium renement is not compelling, to say
the least. As a result, renement of PBE remains an unresolved problem.
A further discussion on using Markov Perfection for equilibrium renement appears in Section 7.3. In
its foreshadow, we argue that Markov Perfection is not a suitable general-purpose equilibrium renement
criterion. This entails that we have to provide a novel specic-purpose justication for the renement of
POE by the Markov Perfection criterion.
In Sections 7.1 and 7.2, we explain in detail a key di¤erence between POE and PBE from the epistemic
point of view, which justies why (in the current sequential bargaining context) rening POE through
Markov perfection is appealing while rening PBE through Markov perfection is objectionable. A formal
principle or a necessary and su¢ cient condition for selecting an equilibrium which is Markov perfect is
developed in the remainder of the current section, with its immediate implication also articulated.
In the previous section we identify a novel cause of potential indeterminacy in bargaining power relation
between a seller and buyer. This cause stems from extraordinarily severe incompleteness of information
(about the type of the buyer) accessible to the seller who has the right to make all o¤ers. Since the ambiguity
in probabilistic beliefs prevents the uniformed player from assessing her bargaining power meaningfully, it
also prevents her from conducting a trade o¤ between a gain in cognitive economies and a gain in bargaining
power (against the opponent), thereby allowing the gain in cognitive economies to prevail in a¤ecting the
bargaining power relation. For cognitive economies to work as an e¤ective equilibrium selection force, we
propose that the following general formal necessary and su¢ cient condition:
Assumption 3 A necessary and su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium that is Markov-perfect to be selected
by the players collectively is that there is no countervailing incentive (in terms of payo¤ ) for any player of
the game to oppose this equilibrium in favor of any alternative equilibrium ex ante.
Assumption 3 trivially implies the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (i) If an equilibrium which is Markov-perfect is (weakly) Pareto dominant among all alternative
equilibria ex ante, then it is selected by the players collectively. (ii) If an equilibrium which is Markov-perfect
is (weakly) Pareto dominated by any alternative equilibrium ex ante, then it is not selected by the players
collectively.
7 Coase ConjectureRevisited
We now compare our analysis of the MPOE with its conventional counterpart perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
In particular, we highlight the main results in relation to the famous Coase Conjecture. We also o¤er
further thoughts on Markov perfection-based equilibrium renement.
7.1 Conventional Dynamic Bayesian Game
In this section we investigate how the results based on our new equilibrium concept di¤er from the con-
ventional perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis. The conventional Bayesian approach assigns a unique prior
probability measure over the state space. This implies in our example of seller o¤er sequential bargaining
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with one-sided incomplete information, the seller must be endowed with a prior probability measure over
the unknown type  of the buyer. If the unique probability measure is to be established with some sense
of epistemic objectivity, then it must summarize a large amount of information. When the informational
asymmetry is severe, the seller is unlikely to have access to such a large amount of information to ascertain
a single prior probability measure. In the extreme, the seller can be completely ignorant about the true
probability measure over the buyers type. Our following discussion again focuses on this extreme case,
with which we intend to highlight an important point when incompleteness of information is severe, the
conventional Bayesian approach has serious weakness, and in fact, its prediction can be misleading.
Let us start with the single prior probability measure that the Bayesian approach presumes even when
complete ignorance is the true epistemic situation. With the Bayesian approach, a uniform probability
distribution is typically used to approximate complete ignorance though the foundations of this approach
are logically dubious31 (see Edward, 1992). In this section we explore perfect Bayesian equilibrium based
on the uniform prior. When interpreting the results obtained here one needs to distinguish the two op-
posing interpretations of the unique prior probability distribution: (1) the uniform distribution represents
epistemically objective knowledge about . (2) the uniform distribution represents epistemically subjective
pretense of knowledge against the backdrop of the epistemic state of complete ignorance about . In case the
second interpretation is the valid one, we argue that the prediction of the conventional PBE and the prob-
lem identied thereby may be misleading, and an alternative ambiguity-based approach e.g., the MPOE
prediction should be pursued.
To ease comparison with the existing literature, in this section we abstract the common interest compo-
nent of the current model by focusing on the limiting S ! 0. Consequently we have w := BaB+S ! a
and  := aB+S ! aB ; and the analyses of the conventional MPBE and PBE can be directly based on
the existing results from the literature (Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole, 1985; Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson,
1986; Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989a,b). Although the results are well known, for the sake of developing
useful intuition we present the analyses in considerable detail.
We rst characterize a pure strategy Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the seller o¤er sequential
bargaining game. This analysis is based on (Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole, 1985). Suppose in this MPBE,
the sellers Markov strategy is given by w (qsupt ) 2 [0;B ], where state variable qsupt 2 [0; 1] is an estimate
of the supremum of the updated buyers type space. The buyers Markov strategy is given by the cut-o¤
strategy:
k (wt; q
sup
t ; ) =
(
1 if   ^ (wt; qsupt ) ;
0 otherwise,
(26)
where ^ (wt; q
sup
t ) is the cut-o¤ type of the buyer, who is indi¤erent between accepting wt and accepting
w

^ (wt; q
sup
t )

in the next period; ^ (wt; q
sup
t ) is such that
^ (wt; q
sup
t ) B   wt =
^ (wt; q
sup
t ) B   w

^ (wt; q
sup
t )

1 + r
: (27)
31Since the single prior probability measure is by assumption not based on real information, it must be based on pure epistemic
subjectivity. Nevertheless it appears to be informative because it is indistinguishable from the identical prior distribution which
is supported by genuine information; therefore it cannot logically represent complete ignorance, but some subjective pretense
of knowledge.
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This equation implies a relationship between function ^ :W!  and function w : !W in equilibrium.
Taking the function w (i.e., the sellers strategy) as given, the above equation denes a functional equation
to which the function ^ is its solution. In general, if the function w varies, the functional equation and its
solution ^ also vary. When the buyers strategy function k is taken as given, then the cut-o¤ type function ^
must be taken as given; consequently, the underlying function w must be taken as given. Here the function
w thus has another interpretation: it is the buyers expectation (or representation) of the sellers strategy.
Conditional on the game has not ended, the evolution of the state variable qsupt is given by the following
law of motion:
qsupt+1 = min
n
qsupt ; ^ (wt; q
sup
t )
o
for t = 0; 1; : : : ;
qsup0 = 1:
Note that if the seller believes (with certainty) that the real type   qsupt 2 (; 1], it will be suboptimal
to choose wt such that ^ (wt; q
sup
t ) > q
sup
t because the o¤er will be rejected with certainty, leaving the state
variable unchanged, i.e., qsupt+1 = q
sup
t . Such an o¤er has the cost of delaying trade without any benet. So for
qsupt 2 (; 1], the optimal choice must be such that qsupt+1 = ^ (wt; qsupt )  qsupt . If the function ^ is strictly
monotone in wt then there is a one-to-one mapping between wt and q
sup
t+1, and the sellers move can be seen
as a choice of the next period value of state variable qsupt+1 = ^ (wt; q
sup
t ), which is implemented by price wt.
The relation between wt and q
sup
t+1 is determined by (27), and takes the following form:
wt =
rBq
sup
t+1 + w
 
qsupt+1

1 + r
; (28)
where function w represents the buyers expectation of the sellers strategy, which a¤ects the denition of
the cut-o¤ type and the buyers strategy. It is also obvious that a choice of qsupt+1 < 
 is suboptimal since
trading with any type  <  has negative payo¤ for the seller.32
Taking as given the buyers strategy, which is captured by equation (28), the sellers optimal strategy
can be formulated as the solution to a dynamic programming problem: it chooses the next period value of
state variable qsupt+1 given the current value q
sup
t . As necessary for sequential rationality, taking its implied
value function W as given, the optimal strategy must maximize the right-hand side of the following Bellman
equation for all qsupt 2 [; 1],
W (qsupt ) = max
qsupt+12[;qsupt ]
(
F (qsupt )  F
 
qsupt+1
 "rBqsupt+1 + w  qsupt+1
1 + r
  a
#
+
1
1 + r
W
 
qsupt+1
)
; (29)
where F () is the cumulative distribution function for the uniform prior; and the sellers (expected) value
function W must be the solution to the above functional equation for all qsupt 2 [; 1]. For qsupt < , we
must have W (qsupt ) = 0 and it is obvious that the constant price o¤er w (q
sup
t ) = w
 can attain this result.
The closed-form solution of an MPBE is given below.
Proposition 4 Suppose S ! 0 and the seller is an expected utility maximizer endowed with a uniform
prior probability measure with the probability density function dF ()d = 1 for  2 [0; 1]. Then there exists an
32Recall that by denition  is the cuto¤ type of buyer with whom the social surplus from trade is zero. If the true type
is  <  then the social surplus from trade is negative; because the buyer does not accept negative surplus from trade, the
sellers surplus from trade must be negative.
22
MPBE for the sequential bargaining game such that the seller plays the Markov strategy:
w (qsupt ) =
(
B (q
sup
t   ) + w if qsupt > ;
w otherwise,
(30)
where
 =  r +
p
r2 + r; (31)
and the buyer plays the Markov cut-o¤ strategy:
k (wt; q
sup
t ; ) =
(
1 if   ^ (wt; qsupt ) ;
0 otherwise,
(32)
where the cut-o¤ type is
^ (wt; q
sup
t ) =
(
1+r
(r+)B
(wt   w) +  if qsupt > ;
1+r
rB
(wt   w) +  otherwise.
(33)
The following corollary connects the MPBE characterized in Proposition 4 and the famous Coase Con-
jecture.
Corollary 1 Suppose S ! 0, the MPBE characterized in Proposition 4 has the following properties:
(i) The expected value for the seller, for qsupt 2 [; 1], is given by
WMPBE (qsupt ) =
B (q
sup
t   )2
2
; (34)
(ii) This MPBE implies the following features of the Coase Conjecture:
lim
S!0;r!0
w (qsup0 ) = a; lim
S!0;r!0
WMPBE (qsup0 ) = 0: (35)
As exemplied in part (ii) of Corollary 1, the Coase Conjecture features that as r ! 0, the price
converges to the competitive level in the twinkling of an eye (Coase, 1972); also the buyer has almost
the full bargaining power as r ! 0. The Coase Conjecture, which focuses on the limiting case r ! 0,
illustrates the more general Coase Problem the limits on monopoly power created by monopolists own
future competition. At the heart of the Coase Problem is a commitment problem the monopoly seller
cannot commit her future self to not undercutting her current price o¤er if it is above the cost level a.
Intuitively, for r > 0, the payo¤ discounting on the buyers behalf makes the good supplied in the future
inferior to the good supplied currently, therefore allows the current price o¤er to contain a premium over the
future price o¤er. This also sets in motion a price deation process and causes a price deation expectation
whenever the price on o¤er is above the competitive level. For the limiting case of r ! 0, the physically
identical goods supplied in the future and the current become almost perfect substitutes. Consequently the
premium contained in the current price o¤er over the future o¤er is almost entirely eliminated. The lack of
commitment on the sellers behalf then causes the initial price o¤er to almost immediately converge to the
limit value of the price deation process, which is the competitive price.
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Although we derive the features of the Coase Conjecturefrom a particular MPBE, as is well known in
the literature (Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson, 1986), this MPBE turns out to be representative of all MPBE
as far as the limiting results are concerned. The following theorem presents a more general version of the
Coase Conjecture, which is based on Theorem 3 of Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986). For the sake of
brevity, we refrain from producing a formal proof of this theorem in this paper. Interested readers should
consult their original proof.
Theorem 2 (Coase Conjecture (Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986))) Suppose S ! 0 and
the seller is an expected utility maximizer endowed with a uniform prior probability measure with the proba-
bility density function dF ()d = 1 for  2 [0; 1]. For any " > 0 and any Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(MPBE), there exists r > 0 such that for any r 2 (0; r) the initial price o¤er in this MPBE is w0 < a+ ".
The Coase Conjecture, however, only applies to the MPBE; it can be reversed when PBE is used
as the solution concept instead of MPBE. The Folk Theorem presented below is based on Ausubel and
Deneckere (1989a,b). These authors established that a large set of sellers expected payo¤s ranging from
0 (the Coase Conjecture) to the static monopoly prot can be obtained by a continuum of reputation
equilibria (PBE) for r ! 0 which depend on both players playing some coordinated trigger strategies. We
present the Folk Theorem rst, followed by an intuitive explanation about how the trigger strategies work.
Theorem 3 (Reputation Equilibria Folk Theorem) Suppose S ! 0 and the seller is an expected
utility maximizer endowed with a uniform prior probability measure with the probability density function
dF ()
d = 1 for  2 [0; 1]. For r ! 0, any expected ex ante seller payo¤ W0 2

0; (B a)
2
4B

(where (B a)
2
4B
is
the static monopoly prot) can be supported in a PBE.
The trigger strategies underpinning this Folk Theorem which are formally dened in the proof of the
theorem have the following feature: the sellers initial price o¤er w0 is above the cost a and conditional
on that the game has not ended the sellers strategy is to let the price o¤er deate exponentially towards
a, as is determined by following equation:
wt   a =

1
1 + r
t
(w0   a) for t = 0; 1; : : : ; (36)
where 11+r is the contraction factor, which has the limiting value: lim(r)!0
1
1+r = 1;  > 0 is a free
strategy-specic parameter which a¤ects the contraction factor 11+r : for given r, smaller  means slower
price deation. For r ! 0, the price deation process is extremely slow. The trigger strategies of both
players are contingent on a state variable ct 2 f1; 0g ct = 1 indicates the seller has a reputation for being a
tough negotiator, and a credibility to sustain an extremely slow price deation process. If the price mark-up
(wt   a) ever deviates from this slow exponential contraction as described by (36) in period t, it will trigger
c = 0 for all  = t + 1; t + 2; : : : ; meaning the seller has forever lost her reputation and it will induce
both players to play the subsequent strategies of the MPBE described in Proposition 4 which, for r ! 0,
make the price o¤er immediately to converge to a, and therefore serves as a punishment and deterrence for
the seller to deviate. By way of creating and sustaining a payo¤-enhancing reputation (or credibility), the
seller can alleviate the commitment problem that is at the heart of the Coase Conjecture. Interestingly,
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Ronald Coase (1972) not only conceived the Coase Conjecture, but also famously pointed out how it
could be reversed through contractual or institutional means in the durable good monopoly context. For
example, the monopolist seller of the durable good could sign a contract with buyers promising to refund
the price di¤erence if she in the future sells the good at a lower price. This way the monopolist can commit
her future self to not undercutting the current price o¤er, therefore induces the buyer to accept the initial
static monopoly price. Similarly, the institutional mechanism featured in a reputation equilibrium also
commits the future self of the seller to not undercutting current price o¤er aggressively i.e., to commit to
deating the price o¤er extremely slowly.
If Markov perfection is used as a renement, the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes can be eliminated
for the limiting case of r ! 0, and the Coase Conjecturewill be sustained. There is, however, no compelling
argument to support this renement. It eliminates all reputation equilibria, and it selects the MPBE only
because the latter is simpler than the former. Given the fact that the sellers ex ante expected payo¤ is
lower in the MPBE than any (interesting) PBE reputation equilibrium, a counter argument therefore can
be made for the seller there is a trade o¤ between simplicity (cognitive economies) and loss of expected
payo¤ and bargaining power; there is no obvious reason why the seller should be willing to coordinate with
the buyer to play the MPBE, which is based on the prevalence of simplicity.
As an implication of Assumption 3, we can summarize the above arguments formally as the following:
Proposition 5 For r ! 0, no MPBE in (the conventional Bayesian version of) the bargaining game (with
uniform prior) is selected by the players collectively.
Given that Markov perfection is an objectionable criterion in the context of (Bayesian) sequential bar-
gaining, the renement of PBE thereby requires some alternative criterion. Without a compelling criterion
for equilibrium renement emerging in this literature, bargaining indeterminacy remains unresolved theo-
retically. At least, it is fair to claim that the Coase Conjecture is reversed in the conventional Bayesian
model of seller o¤er sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information. To understand why the
Coase Conjectureis challenged, notice that the presumed uniform single prior allows the seller to identify
the static monopoly price, and also makes it plausible for her to commit to this monopoly pricingwith
the reputation mechanism. This strategic feasibility is underpinned by an epistemic commitment of the seller
to the truth of the uniform single prior. Of course, in the extreme case of complete ignorance about the
buyers type, there is no rational ground for such an epistemic commitment of the seller to the truth of the
uniform single prior, and the above analysis will not be suitable.33 Instead, the application of our model of
sequential bargaining under ambiguity and its MPOE prediction become a better t.
7.2 Coase Conjecture2.0
Interestingly, the Coase Conjecturends a new incarnation in the unique MPOE in our model of sequential
bargaining under ambiguity. Recall that w0 = w ! a as S ! 0. Notably, this new incarnation does not
rely on the limiting condition r ! 0. That is, for the new Coase Conjectureto hold, the good supplied by
any future self of the seller does not have to be an almost perfect substitute of the good currently supplied.
33 In the durable good monopoly setting that was analyzed by Coase (1972), the equivalent epistemic situation to the ambiguity
of beliefs in our model would be a complete ignorance on the monopolists behalf about the true demand function. Therefore,
the monopolist would have a complete ignorance about what the true static monopoly price is.
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In contrast to the conventional Bayesian model, our model with ambiguity about buyer types allows a
convincing argument to justify the application of Markov perfection to rene the multiplicity of POE. Here
the potential bargaining indeterminacy based on multiplicity of POE is caused by the large multiplicity of
priors. Consequently, the epistemic justication for using Markov perfection as a renement criterion in
MPOE di¤ers profoundly from that in MPBE. The criterion of Markov perfection selects the simplest (or
the cognitively most economical) strategic interactions among multiplicity of equilibria. While the argument
to justify the selection of MPBE among multiplicity of PBE is not compelling or not even appealing because
it implicitly (and controversially) assumes that the seller generally favors simplicity in the trade o¤ between
cognitive economies and bargaining power. The same weakness does not a¤ect the MPOE, because there is
no discernible trade o¤ between simplicity and payo¤ for the seller since her max-inf expected utility over
all non-conditionally-weakly-dominated strategies are the same, namely zero.
To understand the last argument, note that in no POE does the o¤er price go below w, because such
an o¤er gives the seller a negative inmum of expected payo¤, which is inferior to the o¤er of w. Given
this, two implications can be drawn: First, for buyer type  = 0, the expected seller payo¤ is zero for all
POE, which must be the max-inf expected utility for the seller in all POE.
The second implication is that the unique MPOE gives the buyer the maximum payo¤ among all POE
because the price w is the lowest among them. Therefore the buyer should have no incentive to oppose
the unique MPOE in favor of any alternative POE ex ante.
As an implication of Assumption 3, we can summarize the above arguments formally as the following:
Proposition 6 The unique MPOE in the ambiguity version of the bargaining game is selected by the players
collectively.
It is also worth mentioning that this new Coase Conjectureversion 2.0 based on MPOE is robust to
reversion that may be caused by a reputation equilibrium, because even if such a reputation equilibrium
does exist as a POE, it is not an MPOE, and therefore it cannot survive the renement based on Markov
perfection.
7.3 Markov Perfection for Equilibrium Renement? It Depends
According to Maskin and Tirole (2001), one practical reason for Markov perfection in applied game theory
is that it is often quite successful in eliminating or reducing a large multiplicity of equilibria in dynamic
games, and thus in enhancing the predictive power of the model.Behind such practical virtue, there is also
a philosophical appeal that Markov strategies prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is consistent with
rationality.For dynamic games with observable actions (i.e., perfect or almost perfect information), Maskin
and Tirole (2001) demonstrate that this philosophical principle can be formulated precisely and consistently
to give exact formal denitions of Markov strategy and Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). Informally, a
Markov strategy depends only on payo¤-relevant past events. More precisely, it is measurable with respect
to the coarsest partition of histories for which, if all other players use measurable strategies, each players
decision-problem is also measurable.
Inspired by this deep insight, we require Markov strategy to prescribe the simplest form of behavior
that is consistent with rationality,which is interpreted in the specic contexts of the models. For MPOE
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example analyzed in this paper, it is impossible to reduce the lists of state variables any further. One potential
benet of focusing the analysis on Markov equilibrium is to avoid multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes. This
is achieved by the unique MPOE of our seller o¤er sequential bargaining game (see Theorem 1).
One of the motivations for favoring Markov strategy is the view that it can help avoid variables which
are not directly payo¤-relevant, but facilitate the bootstrappingproperty. According to Maskin and Tirole
(2001), [Markov] strategies depend on as few variables as possible; they involve no complex bootstrapping
in which each player conditions on a particular variable only because others do the same. It is, however,
well known that this goal is not always desirable. Notably, the Markov perfect equilibrium of the innitely
repeated prisonersdilemma game eliminates all cooperative (or collusive) equilibria, which Pareto dominate
the MPE a violation of Lemma 1. Also, the Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium (MPBE) of the (seller
o¤er) sequential bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information eliminates all the reputation equi-
libria, which enhance the bargaining power of the seller a violation of Proposition 5. To say the least, there
exists no compelling argument to justify the Markov equilibria in these contexts. In contrast, when we apply
Markov perfection as a renement criterion to the set of POE, we observe that the MPOE does not select
any (weakly) Pareto dominated POE, or reduce bargaining power of any player. This is conrmed by the
fact the selection of the MPOE does not reduce the uninformed sellers bargaining power while enhancing
the informed buyers bargaining power a consistency with Assumption 3 and Proposition 6.
On the surface, the MPOE stands out among the multiplicity of POE because it is the simplest. Another
contributing factor for the MPOE to be selected is that because of the severe epistemic disadvantage the
seller has about the buyers type, she lacks the incentive and willingness to experiment with higher prices in
order to enhance her bargaining power. This fact about the sellers lack of incentive, which is known to the
buyer, gives the buyer a re-enforced incentive to resist higher prices, on the basis of a strategically justied
deationary expectation. These incentive factors thus join force with cognitive economies to facilitate the
selection of the MPOE, which underpins the Coase Conjecture2.0.
8 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study a class of dynamic games of incomplete information in the context of sequential
bargaining with one-sided incomplete information. A seller has the exclusive right to make o¤ers to a buyer,
whose valuation of the transaction is his private information and thus his type. If the o¤er is accepted, trade
occurs; otherwise the seller can revise the o¤er in the next period. Payo¤s for both players are discounted at a
common positive rate. Unlike conventional Bayesian models of bargaining with asymmetric information, we
do not assume that the seller has a unique prior distribution over the buyers type  2 [0; 1]. Instead, we allow
the seller to hold multiple prior probability measures over . We assume the seller has completely ignorance
about value of  in order to illustrate that the degree of incompleteness of information can signicantly exceed
what a conventional Bayesian model permits. This assumption is represented by the set of all plausible prior
probability measures over [0; 1]. This gives rise to a process by which the seller iteratively selects beliefs
over  based on observational facts and a likelihood function that is derived from the common knowledge
about the game and the concept of equilibrium. Following the works of Manski (2008) and GMMS (2010),
the seller is assumed to maximize her inmum expected utility over non-weakly-dominated strategies. As
a solution concept for the game, we propose an extension of perfect Bayesian equilibrium to a setting in
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which the uninformed seller has multiple priors. We call this extension the perfect objectivist equilibrium
(POE). We show that the epistemic under-determination of probabilistic belief constitutes a novel cause for
potential bargaining indeterminacy i.e., multiplicity of POE and call for its resolution through equilibrium
renement based on the criterion of Markov perfection. We fully characterize the Markov perfect objectivist
equilibrium (MPOE) for the illustrative model, and establish the uniqueness of MPOE.
The renement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in the bargaining context remains an unresolved
problem partially because the renement through Markov perfection is objectionable. We nevertheless
argue that the renement of POE through Markov perfection is better justiable on an epistemic ground.
The selection of Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium (MPBE) among the multiplicity of PBE, including
a continuum of reputation equilibria, entails the objectionable assumption that in the trade o¤ by the
uninformed seller between expected payo¤ and cognitive economies the latter prevails in general. The
selection of MPOE among the multiplicity of POE does not entail such an assumption because the multiplicity
of POE is caused by the ambiguity of probabilistic beliefs (or ignorance), which also makes the expected payo¤
for the uninformed seller undened. Consequently this removes any meaningful trade o¤ between expected
payo¤ and cognitive economies and hence allows the latter to prevail. Intuitively, the severe ambiguity of
probabilistic beliefs of the uninformed seller weakens her sense of the surplus extraction component in
the bargaining game, strengthens her sense of the surplus creationcomponent, and therefore transforms
the bargaining game into a coordination gamethat incentivizes her to maximize the social surplus from
trade. This result can be seen as a reincarnation and resurrection of the famous Coase Conjecture in
the face of severe ignorance of the buyer type or demand, an apparent monopoly results in a competitive
outcome. Not only does this not require the discount rate to approach zero, it is also robust to reversion
that may be caused by a reputation equilibrium. To distinguish from the original Coase Conjecture and the
Coase Conjecturebased on the conventional Bayesian models, we can call this new Coase Conjecture
characterized in the current paper Coase Conjecture2.0.
Our analysis has a striking implication for the post-crisis secular economic growth: After major nancial
or economic crises like the historical Great Depression or the recent Great Recession, when the intellectual
and epistemic condence of many entrepreneurs and investors are deeply shaken, their beliefs about future
demands may well be characterized as more ambiguous in the sense which is the theme of the current
paper. This implies that the Coase Problem the limits on monopoly power created by monopolists own
future competition probably should be taken more seriously in the post-crisis era.34 After major nancial
or economic crises, it is likely that demand functions for novel durable goods are a¤ected by uncertainty.
Signicantly, these will increase the ignorance and ambiguity on prospective entrepreneursbehalf about the
demand functions, then the Coase Conjecture2.0 implies a shift of bargaining power from (uninformed)
durable good monopolists to the buyers, which corrodes monopoly rents. This shift of bargaining power can
manifest itself in buyersdeationary expectation in the face of high prices. When the deationary expectation
becomes deeply rooted in buyersstrategic intentionality, the informationally seriously disadvantaged sellers
can be easily persuaded to accept it and the associated bargaining power shift. Why does it matter? Well,
34Broadly speaking, taking the Coase Problem more seriously implies, for microeconomic analysis and industrial organization,
some rethinking about analyzing market power in imperfectly competitive markets. For example, the conventional assumption
that the true demand function is automatically and entirely known to the monopoly or oligopoly rm(s) seems to deserve
qualication and maybe altering on epistemic ground. The gain from this change can be a better understanding of the relation
between information (or a serious lack of information) about the demand function and market power.
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if Schumpeter (1934) was right to claim that monopoly rent is the key to make innovation to pay for
itself, and innovation is the engine of economic growth, then this Coase Conjecture2.0 may deprive the
post-crisis growth of an engine fueled by monopoly rents. It matters because this could be a contributing
factor to secular stagnation, a notion which originated from Alvin Hansen (1939), and after being brought to
prominence by Larry Summers recently, is becoming a serious concern for contemporary economists (Teulings
and Baldwin, 2014).35 To appreciate why this Coase Conjecture2.0 may be relevant to the concern over
secular stagnation, lets start with a quote from Summers (2014):  Perhaps Says dubious law has a more
legitimate corollary Lack of Demand creates Lack of Supply.Then one can go a step further to suggest:
Lack of Knowledge about Demand Function creates Lack of Supply.The ignorance or ambiguity about
the demand function, according to Coase Conjecture2.0, limits a prospective innovators power to extract
monopoly rent Schumpeterian entrepreneurial prot therefore discouraging the supply of innovation in
the rst place.
Finally, we have two caveats: First, we believe the Coase Conjectures (old or new) are merely the
poster child of the profound Coase Problem. Although the Coase Conjecturesare extreme results based
on some extreme assumptions, the profundity of the Coase Problem is unlikely to vanish even if these extreme
assumptions are relaxed. Second, admitting the possibility of Secular Stagnation does not suggest that it is
inevitable. For example, if the corrosion of private sector entrepreneurial prots by the Coase Problem is a
key issue, then public subsidies for (private sector) entrepreneur-lead innovations can address the problem.
Then a real challenge will be how public policies can achieve this goal intelligently under their own constraints
of severe incompleteness of information and ambiguity.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For any (well dened) posterior t (jht;0; s) 2Mt (ht; s), it follows from (11) that
t
 I  ht; s jht;0; s = 1:
Since M0 includes all plausible probability distributions over  () i.e., M0 is su¢ ciently large
(inclusive) we must have t (jht;0; s) 2M0. In conjunction, we must also have
t
 jht;0; s 2 0 2M0j0  I  ht = 1	 ;
which implies
Mt
 
ht; s
  0 2M0j0  I  ht = 1	 : (37)
Conversely, for  2 f0 2M0j0 (I (ht; s)) = 1g, BayesRule (11) implies
t
 Ajht;; s =   A \ I  ht; s =  (A)    A \  nI  ht; s =  (A)
for all A 2  (), where the last equality follows from  (A \ (nI (ht; s)))   (nI (ht; s)) = 1  
 (I (ht; s)) = 0. Since the posterior equals the prior, we must have
 2Mt
 
ht; s

;
which implies 
0 2M0j0
 I  ht; s = 1	 Mt  ht; s : (38)
It follows from (37) and (38) we must have
Mt
 
ht; s

=

0 2M0j0
 I  ht; s = 1	 :

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
This is a game of perfect information. To prove the strategy prole given by (19) and (20) constitutes a
SPNE, it su¢ ces to prove that each players strategy is sequentially rational. Notice that given the sellers
strategy w () = B , the maximal possible payo¤ the buyer can get in period t is 0 for all t = 0; 1; : : :. This
can already be achieved by the buyers strategy
k (wt; ) =

1 if wt  B ;
0 otherwise;
if the seller deviates and o¤ers wt 6= B , it is optimal for the buyer to accept i¤ wt  B , that is, i¤
the buyer has non-negative surplus from current trade and the payo¤ is at least as good as buying in the
next period at price B , which gives the buyer a surplus of zero this is exactly what the buyer strategy
entails. Since buyer strategy in question is optimal for both wt = B and wt 6= B , it must be sequentially
rational. Similarly, given the buyers strategy in question, the maximal possible payo¤ the seller can get in
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period t is
S + B   a = (   ) (S + B) > 0:
Note, this can already be achieved by the sellers strategy in question, which must also be sequentially
rational.
What remains to be shown is that the strategy prole in question constitutes the unique SPNE for the
given  2 (; 1]. The key of the proof is to show that the full set of prices o¤ered by any SPNE seller
strategy in any subgame is a singleton which only contains w () = B . Let winf denote the inmum of the
full set of prices o¤ered by the seller according some SPNE equilibrium strategy in some subgame. Since we
have found a SPNE for this game and also know the prices o¤ered in any subgame of any SPNE is bounded,
so winf as the inmum of a non-empty bounded set is well dened. Let w (ht; ) denote generally the o¤er
made after any history ht in any SPNE, then the denition of winf entails w (ht; )  winf . Also, if the buyer
rejects w (ht; ), the best price he can expect to get in the next period is no less than winf which implies
the present value of payo¤ is no more than B w
inf
1+r , i.e., B  w (ht; )  B w
inf
1+r . Since this inequality
holds generically, it must hold for the limit w (ht; )! winf that is, B winf  B winf1+r  which implies
winf  B (for r > 0) and hence w (ht; )  B . As a result in any SPNE, we must have k (ht; ) = 1 if
wt < B that is, any (negative deviation from the inmum) wt < B would be accepted immediately.
Since any o¤er wt > B implies strictly negative payo¤ for the buyer it must be rejected. Therefore the
highest price that can be accepted is B . So far we have established that if w (ht; ) is a SPNE strategy of
the seller, which is acceptable by the buyers strategy in a SPNE, then we must have w (ht; ) = B which
gives the seller a surplus of (   ) (S + B) > 0.
We are still to prove that in any SPNE, the o¤er w (ht; ) must be acceptable by the buyers strategy in
that SPNE implying that w (ht; ) = B . Otherwise, we must suppose that w (ht; ) > B (nitely) for
some SPNE after some history ht. Since w (ht; ) will be rejected, the maximal discounted payo¤ the seller
can get in future trade is ( 
)(S+B)
1+r , which is strictly smaller than [(   ) (S + B)  "] for some
" 2

0; r( 
)(S+B)
1+r

 the payo¤ the seller can get if she o¤ers wt = B   ". Notice that wt which is
below the inmum is acceptable by the buyers strategy in all SPNE. So we derive a contradiction from the
supposition that w (ht; ) > B (nitely) the contradiction implies the negation of the supposition we
must have w (ht; ) = B , which is identical to the strategy described by (19) in Proposition 2.
Last we prove that in any SPNE the buyers strategy must entail k (ht; ) = 1 if wt = B . Other-
wise, we have to suppose that there exists a SPNE such that the seller o¤ers w (ht; ) = B and buyers
strategy is k (ht; ) = 0 if wt = B this strategy prole obviously results in a rejection of w (ht; ) in
period t. After that, the sellers discounted payo¤ can not exceed ( 
)(S+B)
1+r . Instead, if the seller
deviates to the price wt = B   " for some " 2

0; r((S+B) a)1+r

, then the payo¤ for the seller will be
[(   ) (S + B)  "] > ( 
)(S+B)
1+r  which is a protable deviation for the seller. This contradicts
the supposition. Consequently, the buyers strategy must must be k (ht; ) = 1 if wt = B . Overall, the
buyers strategy must be k (ht; ) = 1 i¤ wt  B , which is identical to strategy described by (20) in
Proposition 2.
It is straightforward to verify that the unique SPNE outcome is that trade occurs on the equilibrium
path. Since the social surplus is maximized, it is impossible to make either player better o¤ without making
the other one worse o¤. Hence, Pareto e¢ ciency is obtained.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
To see that the buyers cut-o¤ strategy sB (h
t) as specied by (23) is sequentially rational, note that given
the sellers constant strategy w as specied in (21)) the maximal possible payo¤ (without discounting)
for the buyer is 
(   ) B > 0 for  2 (; 1] ;
0 for  2 [0; ] ;
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which can already be achieved by the buyer strategy sB (h
t); if the seller deviates and o¤ers wt 6= w, it is
optimal for the buyer to accept i¤
B   wt  max

0;
B   w
1 + r

;
that is, i¤ the buyer has non-negative surplus from current trade and the payo¤ is at least as good as buying
in the next period at price w this is exactly what the buyer strategy sB (h
t) entails. Since sB (h
t) is
optimal for both wt = w and wt 6= w, it must be sequentially rational.
Conversely, we will show that the constant seller strategy sS (h
t) = w is sequentially rational i.e.,
given the buyers cut-o¤ strategy sB (h
t), it passes the max-inf criterion36 and is not weakly dominated
conditional on any plausible set of posteriorsMt (ht; s).
First, notice that the cut-o¤ type for wt = w is ^ (w) = , who brings payo¤ S +w a = 0 to
the seller, which is the inmum of seller payo¤ for the constant strategy sS (h
t) = w. For any alternative
seller strategy w (ht), consider buyer type  2 [0; ) and notice that the sellers surplus from trading
with type  2 [0; ) is strictly negative since the set fwt   a+ S j  S  wt  B ;  2 [0; )g =
[ S   a; 0) is an interval in the negative region. Given the buyer strategy sB (ht), a buyer never makes
a loss from trade, therefore the inmum of the sellers payo¤ when dealing with type  2 [0; ) is zero at
best. That means the constant strategy w satises the max-inf criterion.
Second, we prove that constant strategy w is not weakly dominated conditional on any set of posteriors
Mt (ht; s). Suppose the opposite that is, there exists an alternative (pure) strategy w (ht) and a history
ht
0
and the associated set of posteriorsMt0

ht
0
; s

such that the continuation strategy of w (ht) following
history ht
0
weakly dominates w conditional onMt0

ht
0
; s

.
The sellers belief updating following history ht
0
can be exhaustively categorized into the following
two cases: (1) Mt0

ht
0
; s

= M0, which occurs if t0 = 0 or I

ht
0
; s

= ?, or (2) Mt0

ht
0
; s

=
f 2M0j ([0; )) = 1g, which occurs if I

ht
0
; s

= [0; ) 6= ? in detail, for t0 = 1; 2; : : :, the o¤ers
are w = w for  = 0; 1; : : : ; t0 and are always rejected, then the seller can infer that  2 [0; ).
In case (2), evidently w is optimal since given the buyer strategy sB (h
t) it will not induce any type
 2 [0; ) to buy (by lowering the price). So it is trivial to show that w cannot be weakly dominated
by w (ht) conditional on case (2). Therefore one has to suppose that w is weakly dominated by w (ht)
conditional on case (1)Mt0

ht
0
; s

=M0.
Obviously, if w

ht
0

= w, then a buyer of all types  2 [; 1] will buy at price w and all types
0 2 [0; ) will not buy at price w. Since it is suboptimal for the seller to induce any type 0 2 [0; ) to
buy, it is impossible for w (ht) to weakly dominate w if w

ht
0

 w, we have to infer that w

ht
0

> w.
It follows that all types  2

;
w

ht
0
B

will not buy at price w

ht
0

because of negative payo¤. If
there exists some 0 2

;
w

ht
0
B

such that the subsequent strategy of w (ht) fails to eventually induce
0 to buy, then w (ht) is inferior to w conditional on the Dirac measure 0 2 Mt0

ht
0

=M0, therefore
the former does not weakly dominate the latter. Consequently, in order for w (ht) to weakly dominate w
conditional onMt0

ht
0
; s

=M0, for any type n := +
w

ht
0
B
 
n+1 2

;
w

ht
0
B

, n = 1; 2; : : :, there
must exist a period tn  t0 + 1 such that the o¤er w (htn) induces type n to buy in period tn. Necessarily
36For brevity and without loss of clarity, in the remainder of this paper we write max-inf criterion in place of max-inf
expected utility criterion.
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w (htn)  nB . Notice that n is decreasing in n. Since the buyer strategy sB (ht) is a cut-o¤ strategy, an
o¤er that is accepted according to sB (h
t) by type n must also be accepted by type n0 > n. Then it is
obvious that tn  tn0 if n < n0 or, equivalently, n > n0 implying that the lower type n must not buy
the good earlier than the higher type n0 .
For w (ht) not to be inferior to w conditional on Dirac measure n it must be at least equally protable
for the seller to sell to type n at price w (htn) in period tn as to sell at price w in period t0. As an
implication the following inequalities must hold:
w + nS   a  w (h
tn) + nS   a
(1 + r)
tn t0 
nB + nS   a
(1 + r)
tn t0 ;
where the second inequality is implied by the necessary condition: w (htn)  nB for type n to accept
w (htn). It follows that
(1 + r)
tn t0  nB + nS   a
w + nS   a =
B + S
S
:
Since r > 0, we must have
tn   t0 
ln

B+S
S

ln (1 + r)
<1 for all n = 1; 2; : : : ; (39)
that is, for all n = 1; 2; : : :, (tn   t0) is uniformly bounded from above. Without loss of generality, let
T := max

t0 + iji  ln
S+B
S
ln(1+r) for all i = 0; 1; : : : ;

be the deadline to conclude trade with all types n =
1; 2; : : :. It must follow that there exists some period T 2

t0; : : : ; T
	
such that w
 
hT
  w for some
hT and w (h ) > w for all h ,  = t0; : : : ; T   1. Notice that T is dened as the earliest period in which
the price will reach or cross w from above according to strategy w (ht) if the game has not ended. Let
w := min fw (h ) j = t0; : : : ; T   1;8 plausible hg be the lowest price that strategy w (h ) reaches before
period T which is the minimum of a non-empty nite set, and must exist. Therefore all types n such that
n 2

; wB

buy at price w
 
hT
  w in period T > t0 in response to the deviation strategy w (ht)
and according to buyer strategy sB (h
t) which is based on the expectation that the future prices will be
constantly w; while they buy at price w in period t0 in response to the constant strategy w. Clearly,
for each type n 2

; wB

, the strategy w (ht) is inferior to the constant strategy w conditional on
the Dirac measure n because the former sells at no higher price (w
 
hT
  w) to type n and with
a delay which contradicts the presupposition that the former weakly dominates the latter conditional on
Mt0

ht
0

. In conclusion, the constant strategy w is not weakly dominated conditional on anyMt (ht).
The Markov perfection property of strategy prole s is conrmed by the fact that the list of state
variables i.e., ? for the seller, and f; wtg for the buyer cannot be reduced further.
We now derive the uniqueness of MPOE. Notice that to be an MPOE, the sellers strategy must be
constant let it be denoted by w. If 0  w < w, then it incentivizes type  2
h
w
B
; 

to buy and leaves
the seller with negative payo¤ and fails the max-inf criterion; if w < w  B , the buyers sequentially
rational strategy must be
k (wt; ) =
(
1 if B   wt  max
n
0; 11+r (B   w)
o
;
0 otherwise.
Given this as the buyers strategy, the constant strategy w cannot be sequentially rational because following
a rejection of w, the seller will infer that the true buyer type is  2
h
0; wB

and given this belief the constant
strategy w weakly dominates w. To see why? Note that the price o¤er w means no trade ex post; with the
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price the o¤er w, non-negative seller payo¤ is guaranteed, and the seller gets positive surplus from trade
conditional on priors  such that  2

; wB

. Consequently, for MPOE we must have w = w and the
buyers strategy as given by sB (h
t), and hence the uniqueness of the MPOE.
The rest of the proof is straightforward.
A.4 An Example of Weakly Dominated Strategy which Satises the max-inf
Expected Utility Criterion
Consider a one-period model with the (articial) buyer type space: [0; 1). Suppose the buyer plays the
following strategy:
k (w; ) =
(
1 if   max
n
w
B
; ^ (w)
o
;
0 otherwise,
where w is the price on o¤er; ^ (w) = (1+r)w w

rB
is the cut-o¤ type for our purpose of looking at the seller
choice under ambiguity, it does not matter whether the buyers strategy is optimal or not. We argue that the
following strategy of the seller which is to o¤er the price w^ = B is a weakly dominated strategy which
satises the max-inf criterion. To see this, rst notice that for all types  2 [0; ), the sellers surplus from
trade is negative since the set fw   a+ S j  S  w  B ;  2 [0; )g = [ S   a; 0). Therefore the
inmum of seller surplus for every possible strategy w 2 [0;B ] is zero at best. Second, notice that under
strategy w^ = B there will be no trade, so the seller surplus is always zero which is the maximum inmum.
Third, we argue that strategy w^ = B is weakly dominated by the strategy w := B , conditional on
the ambiguous beliefs f~ 2M0j~ ([0; 1)) = 1g.
The argument is as follows: For all type  2 [0; ] both strategies give the same surplus for the seller
which is zero and also the maximum inmum of seller surplus. For all  2 (; 1), strategy w gives
strictly positive and hence larger seller surplus. Therefore, the strategy w^ = B gives strictly lower expected
value of seller surplus than strategy w for all beliefs 0 2 f 2M0j ([0; 1)) = 1;  ((; 1)) > 0g; while
they are equivalent for all beliefs 0 2 f 2M0j ([0; 1)) = 1;  ((; 1)) = 0g. Furthermore, for all beliefs
~0 2 f~ 2M0j~ ([0; 1)) = 1g strategy w gives the seller either equal or higher surplus in comparison with
strategy w^ = B . Thus, strategy w^ = B is weakly dominated by strategy w for the ambiguous beliefs
f~ 2M0j~ ([0; 1)) = 1g.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of existence will be by construction of a POE for each w0 2 [w; w]. For the limiting case:
w0 = w
, Theorem 1 has already established that the MPOE (s;M (s)) which has initial price o¤er
w0 = w
 constitutes a POE. So we only need to deal with the case w0 2 (w; w].
Denote the POE to be constructed by (s;M (s)). Let the sellers strategy in s be
sS
 
ht

= w (t) =

w0 for t = 0;
w otherwise. (40)
Let ^ (wt) be the cut-o¤ type of buyer who is indi¤erent between buying at price wt  w in the current
period t and buying at price w in the next period. Notice that it su¢ ces to only compare the current and
next period payo¤s because the price is expected to be (constant) w in all future periods so buying in
any further future period than the next is inferior to buying in the next period because of the delay for all
types  2 (; 1]. The indi¤erence condition is given by
B ^ (wt)  wt = B ^ (wt)  w

1 + r
; (41)
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which has the solution
^ (wt) =
(1 + r)wt   w
rB
: (42)
It is easy to verify the following monotonic relation between buyer surplus and type conditional on   wtB :
B   wt R B   w

1 + r
i¤  R ^ (wt) ;
which implies that it is a best response to the sellers strategy w (t) for the buyer to play the following cut-o¤
strategy:
k (wt; ) =
(
1 if   max
n
wt
B
; ^ (wt)
o
;
0 otherwise.
(43)
To prove that the sellers strategy w (t) is sequentially rational, we rst show that given the buyers strategy
k (wt; ), the sellers strategy w (t) passes the max-inf criterion. To see this, notice that
w (t)  w for all t = 0; 1; : : : ;
^ (wt) =
(
(1+r)wt w
rB
>  for wt > w;
 for wt = w:
It follows that given the buyers strategy, the inmum of payo¤ for the seller is 0 under strategy w (t) since
it will be rejected by all types  2 [0; ) yielding payo¤ 0 as the lowest. Faced by possible types  2 [0; )
no alternative strategies can yield positive payo¤ for the seller, therefore the inmum of their payo¤s cannot
be positive. Thus, strategy w (t) passes the max-inf criterion.
Next we establish that the sellers strategy w (t) is not weakly dominated conditional on any beliefs
Mt (ht; s). Suppose the opposite that is, there exist some t0, history ht0 and beliefs Mt0

ht
0
; s

and an
alternative seller strategy w (ht) such that w (ht) weakly dominates w (t) conditional onMt

ht
0
; s

.
The sellers belief updating following history ht
0
can be exhaustively categorized into the following four
cases: (1) I

ht
0
; s

= [0; 1] with t0 = 0, or (2) I

ht
0
; s

=
h
0; ^ (w0)

with t
0
= 1 and I

ht
0
; s

6= ?, or (3)
I

ht
0
; s

= [0; ) with t
0  2 and I

ht
0
; s

6= ?, or (4) I

ht
0
; s

= ? with t0  1. Notice that cases (2)
and (3) occur after the seller has (always) played according to strategy w (t) up to time t0  1 and no o¤er
has been accepted. In these cases
Mt0

ht
0
; s

=
n
 2M0j
h
0; ^ (w (t0   1))

= 1
o
:
Case (4) occurs after the sellers knows by time t0 that the observed history ht
0
contradicts the equilibrium
path of s. In this case, we have t
0  1, I

ht
0
; s

= ? andMt0

ht
0
; s

=M0.
For cases (2), (3) and (4), arguments that are similar to the proof of Theorem 1 can be applied here to
show it is logically impossible for the subsequent strategies of w (t) which become the constant strategy
w from t
0  1 to be weakly dominated by (the subsequent strategies of) w (ht). So what remains to be
dealt with is case (1), which is at the beginning of the game t0 = 0 andMt0

ht
0
; s

=M0.
For case (1), the initial o¤er of strategy w (t) is w0 > w, which is uniquely optimal if the buyer is of
type ^ (w0) 2 (; 1]. Notice that from (42) it follows that ^ (w0) = (1+r)w0 w

rB
. To satisfy the condition
^ (w0) 2 (; 1], we must have w < w0  w + r(B w
)
1+r
:= w, which is satised by assumption. In
order for w (ht) to be at least as good as w (t) for type ^ (w0), we must have w
 
h0

= w0.
Subsequently, if w (ht) = w for t = 1, then all types  2 [; 1] will have bought the good within
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two periods and all the types  2 [0; ) will not and should never be incentivized to buy in the interest
of seller and in this case it is impossible for w (ht) to weakly dominate w (t) since the latter does not
incentivize any type  2 [0; ) to buy. If w  h1 < w, the strategy will have negative payo¤ for the seller
facing buyer type
h
^
 
w
 
h1

; 

, therefore cannot weakly dominate w (t) note, w (t) has the payo¤ of 0
for the seller facing buyer type
h
^
 
w
 
h1

; 

. Then we have to infer that w
 
h1

> w for t = 1.
It follows that all types  2

;min

w(h0)
B
;
w(h1)
B

will not have bought the good according to
strategy sB (ht) in response to o¤ers w (ht) within two periods while they will in response to strategy
w (t). If there exists some 0 2

;min

w(h0)
B
;
w(h1)
B

such that the subsequent strategy of w (ht)
fails to eventually incentivize 0 to buy, then w (ht) is inferior to w (t) conditional on the Dirac measure
0 2 Mt0

ht
0
; s

=M0 notice t0 = 0 for case (1) and therefore w (ht) does not weakly dominate w (t).
Consequently, in order for w (ht) to weakly dominate w (t) conditional on Mt0

ht
0

= M0, for any type
n := 
 +
min
 
w(h0)
B
;
w(h1)
B
!
 
n+1 2

;min

w(h0)
B
;
w(h1)
B

, n = 1; 2; : : :, there must exist a period
tn  1 such that w (htn) incentivizes type n to buy in period tn. Then arguments that are similar to the
proof of Theorem 1 can be applied here to show that there exists an w 2

w;min

w(h0)
B
;
w(h1)
B

and
1 < T 0 <1 such that all types n such that n 2

; wB

buy at price w

hT
0  w in period T 0 > 1 in
response to the deviation strategy w (ht); while they buy at price w in period 1 in response to the strategy
w (t). Clearly, for each type n such that n 2

; wB

, the strategy w (ht) is inferior to the strategy
w (t) conditional on the Dirac measure n because the former sells at no higher price to type n and with
a delay which contradicts the presupposition that the former weakly dominates the latter conditional on
Mt0

ht
0
; s

. In conclusion, the strategy w (t) is not weakly dominated conditional on anyMt (ht; s).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Using the envelope theorem, we can deriveW 0 (qsupt ) evaluated under equation:
rBq
sup
t+1+w(q
sup
t+1)
1+r = w (q
sup
t )
as:
W 0 (qsupt ) = f (q
sup
t ) [w (q
sup
t )  a] ;
where f () is the probability density function. The rst-order condition (FOC) for the maximization
problem evaluated under equation:
rBq
sup
t+1+w(q
sup
t+1)
1+r = w (q
sup
t ) and substituting W
0  qsupt+1) is

F (qsupt )  F
 
qsupt+1
 rB + w0  qsupt+1
1 + r
  f  qsupt+1w (qsupt )  a  11 + r w  qsupt+1  a

= 0: (44)
Since the sellers prior is a uniform distribution, we have F () =  and f () = 1, the FOC gives
 
qsupt   qsupt+1
 rB + w0  qsupt+1
1 + r
 

w (qsupt )  a 
1
1 + r

w
 
qsupt+1
  a = 0: (45)
We consider a plausible MPBE such that for all qsupt 2 [; 1] the function w has the following linear
form:
w (qsupt ) = B (q
sup
t   ) + a; (46)
where  2 [0; 1) is a parameter to be determined. It follows from equations (27) and (46) the cut-o¤ function
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^ takes the following linear form:
^ (wt) =
1 + r
(r + ) B
(wt   a) + : (47)
Given the value of state variable qsupt , if the seller follows her putative MPBE strategy in question we
have wt = w (q
sup
t ). Conditional on this, equations (46), (47) and q
sup
t+1 = ^ (wt) imply that
qsupt+1   
qsupt   
=
(1 + r)
r + 
: (48)
Then from (45), (46) and (48) we can derive for qsupt   the following quadratic equation of :
2 + 2r   r = 0:
which has the following unique positive solution:
 =  r +
p
r2 + r: (49)
We thus have the sellers strategy w (qsupt ) as specied by (30) and (31). It is easy to verify that the
buyers best response to this strategy of the seller is characterized by (32) and (33).
From equations (46), (48) and the fact that w ! a, it follows that for qsupt 2 [; 1] and  = t; t+1; : : : ;
w (qsupt )  a = B (qsupt   ) ;
qsup    =

(1 + r)
r + 
 t
(qsupt   ) ;
and
w (qsup )  a =

(1 + r)
r + 
 t
[w (qsupt )  a] :
As a result, the expected value function of the seller, for qsupt 2 [; 1], is given by:
W (qsupt ) =
P1
=t
1
(1+r) t

F (qsup )  F
 
qsup+1

[w (qsup )  a]
=
P1
=t
1
(1+r) t
 
qsup   qsup+1

[w (qsup )  a]
=
P1
=t
[1  (1+r)r+ ](qsup  )
(1+r) t B (q
sup
   )
= B
h
1  (1+r)r+
i
(qsupt   )2
P1
=t

( (1+r)r+ )
2
 t
(1+r) t
=
B[1  (1+r)r+ ]
1  (
(1+r)
r+ )
2
1+r
(qsupt   )2
=
B(r+ r 2)(qsupt  )2
r+2 2
=
B(q
sup
t  )2
2 (using the fact: 
2 = r   2r)
(50)
It then can be shown that, for qsupt+1 2 [; qsupt ], the second derivative of the objective function (of
maximization) w.r.t. qsupt+1 is
@

F (qsupt )  F
 
qsupt+1
 rB+w0(qsupt+1)
1+r   f
 
qsupt+1
  rBqsupt+1+w(qsupt+1)
1+r   a

+ 11+rW
0  qsupt+1
@qsupt+1
=   (2r + ) B
1 + r
< 0;
that is, the objective function is concave in qsupt+1. This veries the hypothesis that given W
 
qsupt+1

, the
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linear strategy w (qsupt ) or, equivalently, q
sup
t+1 =
(1+r)
r+ (q
sup
t   )+ solves the maximization problem
embedded in the Bellman equation (29). Consequently, function W as specied by (50) must also solve
the Bellman equation (29). By Blackwells theorem and the contraction mapping (xed-point) theorem, the
function W specied by (50) is the unique solution to the Bellman equation (29). Since we have qsupt ! 
as t ! 1, we must have W (qsupt ) ! 0 as t ! 1 and limt!1 1(1+r)tW (q
sup
t ) = 0. The last condition
implies that the Principle of Optimality37 applies. Therefore the strategy w as characterized by (30) and
(31) must maximize the expected seller payo¤ given the belief the uniform probability distribution over the
support [0; qsupt ] and the buyers strategy as specied by (26) and (47). Then, by denition, w must also
be sequentially rational.
A.7 Proof of Corollary 1
Part (i): This result comes from the expected value function of the seller, (50), which has already been
derived in the proof of Proposition 4.
Part (ii): As a preliminary, we derive the following limiting result:
lim
r!0
 = lim
r!0

 r +
p
r2 + r

= 0; (51)
Consequently, we have, for qsupt 2 [; 1] and t = 0; 1; : : :,
lim
r!0
w (qsupt ) = lim
r!0
[B (q
sup
t   ) + w] = w ! a as S ! 0
and
lim
r!0
WMPBE (qsupt ) = lim
r!0
B (q
sup
t   )2
2
= 0: (52)
Because qsup0 = 1 2 [; 1], we have
lim
S!0;r!0
w (qsup0 ) = a; lim
S!0;r!0
WMPBE (qsup0 ) = 0:

A.8 Proof of Theorem 3
Consider that the buyer plays the following (trigger) cut-o¤ strategy:
k (t; wt; ct; q
sup
t ; ) =

1 if   ^ (t; wt; ct; qsupt ) ;
0 otherwise,
(53)
where ^ (t; wt; ct; q
sup
t ) is the cut-o¤ type who, condition on ct, is indi¤erent between buying in period t at
price wt and buying in the next period ^ (t; wt; ct; q
sup
t ) is such that
^ (t; wt; ct; q
sup
t ) B   wt =
^ (t; wt; ct; q
sup
t ) B   w

t+ 1; ct+1; ^ (t; wt; ct; q
sup
t )

1 + r
; (54)
37For a textbook treatment of the Principle of Optimality and the conditions for it to be valid, see Stokey and Lucas (1989,
chapter 4).
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where function w is the sellers (trigger) strategy, dened by
w (t; ct; q
sup
t ) =
8><>:

1
1+r
t
(w0   a) + a if ct = 1;
 (Bq
sup
t   a) + a if ct = 0; qsupt > ;
a if ct = 0; q
sup
t  ;
(55)
where the value of parameter  is specied by (31); state variable ct is the reputation (or credibility)
indicator as is determined by the following law of motion:
ct+1 = ct1wt=w(t;ct;qsupt ) for t = 0; 1; : : : ;
c0 = 1;
(56)
where state variable qsupt is an estimate of the supremum of the updated buyers type space which (condi-
tional on the game has not ended) is dened by the following law of motion:
qsupt+1 = min
n
qsupt ; ^ (t; wt; ct; q
sup
t )
o
for t = 0; 1; : : : ;
qsup0 = 1:
(57)
The indicator function 1wt=w(t;ct;qsupt ) signals by assigning value 0 a deviation of price wt from the strategy
value w (t; ct; q
sup
t ). The rst instance of such a deviation triggers a (self-fullling) switch of the sellers
strategy from the toughphase to the soft phase, together with a (self-fullling) switch of the buyers
expectation about and response to it. In the toughphase (ct = 1), the strategies of both players depend
on time t instead of state variable qsupt ; in the softphase (ct = 0) the strategies depend on state variable
qsupt instead of time t.
On the (tentative PBE) equilibrium path, we have ct = 1 for t = 0; 1 : : : ; and
wt   a =

1
1 + r
t
(w0   a) ; (58)
that is, the price mark-up (wt   a) deates exponentially over time with contraction factor 11+r 2 (0; 1).
Notice that limr!0 11+r = 1, that is, for r ! 0, (wt   a) contracts extremely slowly. The economic meaning
of this is that the seller commits to keeping the o¤er price at almost the initial level w0 within any nite
period of time.
From (54), (58) and (57) we can derive the following linear relations between

qsupt+1   aB

,

^ (t; wt; 1; q
sup
t )  aB

and (wt   a):
qsupt+1  
a
B
= ^ (t; wt; 1; q
sup
t ) 
a
B
=
1 + r   11+r
rB
(wt   a) : (59)
At time t, the expected value for the seller is (in general) given by
W (t; 1; qsupt ) =
P1
=0
1
(1+r) t

F (qsup )  F
 
qsup+1

(w   a)
=
P1
=t
1
(1+r) t
 
qsup   qsup+1

(w   a)
=
P1
=t

qsup   aB

 

qsup+1  aB

(1+r) t (w   a) :
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For non-initial periods: t = 1; 2; : : :
W (t; 1; qsupt ) =
P1
=t

1+r  1
1+r
rB
(w 1 a) 
1+r  1
1+r
rB
(w a)

(1+r) t (w   a)
=
(1+r  11+r )

1
1
1+r
 1

rB
P1
=t

( 11+r )
 t2
(1+r) t (wt   a)
2
=
(1+r  11+r )

1
1
1+r
 1

rB
 
1  (
1
1+r )
2
1+r
!  1
1+r
2t
(w0   a)2
! (1+)B(1+2) (w0   a)
2 (as r ! 0).
For the initial period t = 0
W (0; 1; qsup0 ) =
P1
=0

qsup   aB

 

qsup+1  aB

(1+r) t (w   a)
=

qsup0   aB

 

qsup1   aB

(w0   a) +W (1; 1; qsup1 )
=

1  aB

  1+r 
1
1+r
rB
(w0   a)

(w0   a) +W (1; 1; qsup1 )
!

1  aB

  1+B (w0   a)

(w0   a) + (1+)B(1+2) (w0   a)
2 (as r ! 0)
=

1  aB

(w0   a)  (1+)
2
(1+2)B
(w0   a)2 (as r ! 0).
Given  and for r ! 0, the value of w0 that maximizes W (0; 1; qsup0 ) is:
w0 =
(1 + 2) (B   a)
2 (1 + )
2 + a: (60)
We impose the above relation between free parameters w0 and  notice that w0 is now a decreasing function
of parameter , which has the following limiting values:
w0 ! B + a
2
(static monopoly price) as  ! 0; (61)
w0 ! a (competitive price) as  !1: (62)
Consequently, the initial period (expected) value for the seller is
W (0; 1; qsup0 ) =
(1 + 2) (B   a)2
4 (1 + )
2
B
; (63)
which is a decreasing function of parameter , with the following limiting values:
W (0; 1; qsup0 )!
(B   a)2
4B
(static monopoly prot) as  ! 0; (64)
W (0; 1; qsup0 )! 0 as  !1: (65)
The non-initial period (expected) value, for r ! 0, t = 1; 2; : : :, is
W (t; 1; qsupt ) =
 (1 + 2) (B   a)2
4 (1 + )
3
B
;
which is an inverted-U shaped function of parameter .
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Overall, for 0 <  <1 and r ! 0, we haveW (t; 1; qsupt ) > 0 (nitely) for all t = 0; 1; : : :. Intuitively, this
nitely positive value W (t; 1; qsupt ) deters the seller from initiating a deviation from the strategy specied
by (58) because such a deviation will trigger c = 0 for all  = t + 1; t + 2; : : :, and a switch of strategies
by both players the sellers strategy will become
w (t; 0; qsupt ) =

 (Bq
sup
t   a) + a if qsupt > ;
a otherwise;
(66)
and the buyers strategy will become
k (t; wt; 0; q
sup
t ; ) =

1 if   ^ (t; wt; 0; qsupt ) ;
0 otherwise,
(67)
where the cut-o¤ type is
^ (t; wt; 0; q
sup
t ) =
 1+r
(r+)B
(wt   a) +  if qsupt > ;
1+r
rB
(wt   a) +  otherwise. (68)
In comparison with (30), (32) and (33) it becomes obvious that the above strategies are identical to the
MPBE strategies specied in Proposition 4 (noticing that w ! a and  ! aB as r ! 0). Therefore
these strategies of the two players are mutual best responses they are both sequentially rational conditional
on ct = 0. From (34) and (52) we know the sellers expected value becomes
W (t; 0; qsupt ) = W
MPBE (qsupt ) =
B

qsupt   aB
2
2
! 0 as r ! 0:
To complete the proof that it is not protable for the seller to initiate a deviation from the trigger strategy,
we need to show that the expected payo¤ from deviation is no more than the expected valueW (t; 1; qsupt ) > 0
(nitely). Suppose at time t we have ct = 1 and q
sup
t > 
, and the seller chooses wt < w (t; 1; q
sup
t ), which
will trigger c = 0 for all  = t + 1; t + 2; : : :. Then it will be expected by the buyer that next period
price o¤er will be w
 
t+ 1; 0; qsupt+1

= 
 
Bq
sup
t+1   a

+ a, where qsupt+1 = min
n
qsupt ; ^ (t; wt; 0; q
sup
t )
o
will be
the cut-o¤ type of buyer who will be indi¤erent between buying currently at wt and buying next period at
w
 
t+ 1; 0; qsupt+1

. We have the following equation:
^ (t; wt; 0; q
sup
t ) B   wt =
^ (t; wt; 0; q
sup
t ) B  
h


B ^ (t; wt; 0; q
sup
t )  a

+ a
i
1 + r
;
which has the solution:
^ (t; wt; 0; q
sup
t ) =
(1 + r)wt   (1  ) a
(r + ) B
!1 as r ! 0 for wt > a (nitely):
The implication is that for r ! 0, the only way for wt  a to be acceptable by any type of buyer is wt ! a.
Consequently, the current period payo¤ is (wt   a)

F (qsupt )  F
 
qsupt+1
! 0, and the continuation value is
no more than
WMPBE(qsupt+1)
1+r ! 0; while the expected value of playing the trigger strategy is W (t; 1; qsupt ) > 0
(nitely) for nite  > 0. That is, the deviation from the trigger strategy cannot be protable for r ! 0. As
a result, the trigger strategies constitute a PBE. For r ! 0, as  ranges from 0 to 1, W (0; 1; qsup0 ) ranges
from (B a)
2
4B
(static monopoly prot) to 0.
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